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Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the
Chinese Firm
CURTIS J. MILHAUPT* & WENTONG ZHENG**
Chinese state capitalism has been treated as essentially synonymous with stateowned enterprises (SOEs). But drawing a stark distinction between SOEs and
privately owned enterprises (POEs) misperceives the reality of China’s institutional
environment and its impact on the formation and operation of large enterprises of
all types. We challenge the “ownership bias” of prevailing analyses of Chinese firms
by exploring the blurred boundary between SOEs and POEs in China. We argue that
the Chinese state has less control over SOEs and more control over POEs than its
ownership interest in the firms suggests. Our analysis indicates that Chinese state
capitalism can be better explained by capture of the state than by ownership of
enterprise. We explain the mechanisms of capture in China and argue that due to
China’s institutional environment, large, successful firms—regardless of ownership—
exhibit substantial similarities in areas commonly thought to distinguish SOEs from
POEs: market dominance, receipt of state subsidies, proximity to state power, and
execution of the state’s policy objectives. We explore the significant implications of
this argument for theory, policy, and law.
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INTRODUCTION
Ownership is the touchstone of corporate governance analysis1 and a central
strand of literature on theory of the firm.2 The identity of a corporation’s equity
owners has enormous significance for the oversight and incentives of management, the corporate governance challenges it faces, and ultimately, the goals it
pursues.3
The impact of corporate ownership is considered to be particularly acute
when a contrast is drawn between privately owned enterprises (POEs) and
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). SOEs, by virtue of their privileged position
vis-à-vis the state, are widely believed to enjoy privileged market access, to
pursue noneconomic objectives, and to be uniquely positioned to influence the
rules by which they are regulated.4 A large body of theoretical literature tries to
explain why the state would act as an owner of enterprise.5 And the very
existence of SOEs in domestic and global markets is thought to necessitate
1. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1933) (highlighting the separation of ownership and control in corporations in the United
States); Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999) (finding
that the lack of legal protection for minority investors results in concentrated ownership structures);
Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102
YALE L.J. 1927 (1993) (discussing differences in the ownership of large public corporations in the
United States, Germany, and Japan).
2. See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory
of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986) (advancing a theory of ownership of
the firm as the purchase of residual rights of control); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and
the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990) (theorizing optimal arrangements of asset
ownership to define the boundaries of the firm); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976)
(using agency cost analysis in developing a theory of ownership structure).
3. See, e.g., Saul Estrin & Virginie Pérotin, Does Ownership Always Matter?, 9 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG.
55 (1991) (discussing the relationship between firm ownership and firm performance); Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 267 (1988) (discussing differences in costs of
ownership and costs of market contracting among firms of different ownership types); D. Daniel Sokol,
Competition Policy and Comparative Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, 2009 BYU. L.
REV. 1713, 1720–44 (discussing differences in internal and external controls of firms between private
firms and state-owned enterprises); Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and
Accountability, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1424–30 (2003) (discussing differences in profit incentives
between private firms and government enterprises).
4. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND THE PRINCIPLE
OF COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY 34 (2009) [hereinafter OECD, COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY], available at
http://www1.oecd.org/daf/competition/46734249.pdf (“Governments may create an uneven-playing field
in markets where an SOE competes with private firms, as they have a vested interest in ensuring that
state-owned firms succeed.”).
5. See, e.g., Jiahua Che & Yingyi Qian, Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of
Firms, 113 Q.J. ECON. 467 (1998) (proposing a theory of state ownership of firms in an environment
without secure property rights); Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Privatization and Incentives, 7 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 84 (1991) (discussing the tradeoff between state and private ownership of firms); Klaus
M. Schmidt, The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach, 12 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 1 (1996) (proposing a model of privatization in which different allocations of ownership rights
lead to different allocations of inside information about the firm); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny,
Politicians and Firms, 109 Q.J. ECON. 995 (1994) (proposing a model of bargaining between politicians
and managers to explain the privatization of state-owned firms); Andrei Shleifer, State Versus Private
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special rules for trade, investment, and corporate governance.6 POEs, by contrast, are often idealized as “the quintessence of private property, a sanctuary
from government authority.”7
But what if a state sets the rules for economic activity (or the rules are set by
actors with influence over the state) such that the standard dichotomy between
SOEs and POEs breaks down? In other words, imagine a state in which the
institutional environment results in virtually all large, successful firms—
irrespective of ownership—having close connections to state actors and agencies, access to state largesse, and a role in carrying out the policies of the ruling
political party. Further imagine a state in which no firm—again irrespective of
ownership—is truly autonomous from the government.
In this Article, we argue that contemporary China is such a state. Analysts
have devoted considerable attention to SOEs “as the primary vehicles for
Chinese state capitalism.”8 This attention is deserved, but incomplete. Drawing
a stark distinction among Chinese firms based on the ownership of enterprise
(SOE versus POE) to frame Chinese state capitalism, we argue, misperceives
the reality of that country’s institutional environment as it has evolved in the
economic reform era and its impact on the formation and operation of large
enterprises of all types. Functionally, SOEs and large POEs in China share
many similarities in the areas commonly thought to distinguish state-owned
firms from privately owned firms: market access, receipt of state subsidies,
proximity to state power, and execution of the government’s policy objectives.
A complete account of Chinese state capitalism must explain these similarities.

Ownership, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 133 (1998) [hereinafter Shleifer, State Versus Private] (discussing the
appropriate role of state ownership).
6. For example, Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) requires “state
trading enterprises,” defined to include state-owned enterprises and enterprises with exclusive or special
privileges, to act in a manner consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment in
its purchases or sales involving either imports or exports. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article
XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1157.
China’s WTO Accession Protocol also contains a special requirement for Chinese state-owned enterprises: subsidies provided to Chinese state-owned enterprises are considered per se specific and
therefore are subject to discipline under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures if, “inter alia, state-owned enterprises are the predominant recipients of such subsidies or
state-owned enterprises receive disproportionately large amounts of such subsidies.” Protocol on the
Accession of the People’s Republic of China, ¶ 10.2, WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001). In addition, a number
of free-trade agreements the United States has entered into have special provisions on SOEs. See IAN F.
FERGUSSON ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42694, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS AND
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 47–48 (2013). Special disciplines for SOEs have also been proposed in the
ongoing negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership. See id.
7. WILLIAM G. ROY, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN AMERICA
xiv (1997).
8. USHA C.V. HALEY & GEORGE T. HALEY, SUBSIDIES TO CHINESE INDUSTRY: STATE CAPITALISM, BUSINESS
STRATEGY, AND TRADE POLICY 24 (2013); see also Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the
(National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV.
697 (2013) (providing analysis of Chinese SOEs as a “networked hierarchy” with deep connections to
the party-state).
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Simultaneously, recognizing the functional blurriness of corporate ownership
categories in the Chinese context calls attention to how the rules of the game for
economic activity are shaped in contemporary China. Our central claim is that
Chinese state capitalism is closely associated with state capture. That is, large
firms in China—whether SOEs, POEs, or ambiguous state-private blends—
survive and prosper precisely because they have fostered connections to state
power and have succeeded in obtaining state-generated rents.9 As a result, large
firms in China exhibit substantial similarities in their relationship with the state
in ways that distinctions based on corporate ownership simply do not pick up.
Indeed, as preparations for the initial public offering of Alibaba on the New
York Stock Exchange in 2014 revealed, it can be difficult to draw a clear
distinction between a “state-owned” Chinese firm and a “private” one with
extensive ties to politically powerful backers.10 We do not argue that corporate
ownership is completely irrelevant in China or that Chinese POEs are identical
in all respects to SOEs. The claim is simply that with respect to the relationship
between firms and the state, a focus on ownership alone is likely to mislead in
the Chinese context, and policies pivoting on equity ownership are likely to
miss the mark.
Looking beyond ownership is not only essential to understanding Chinese
state capitalism; it also has important policy implications. The international
trade and investment regimes draw stark distinctions between POEs and SOEs,
with the latter being subjected to extra “disciplines” intended to account for
their special qualities. Similarly, the corporate governance challenges of POEs
and SOEs are thought to be sufficiently distinct to merit separate codes of best
practice.11 And the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s
(OECD) “competitive neutrality” project starts from the assumption that SOEs
(alone) enjoy unique state access and privileges that can distort competition in

9. As we elaborate below, we use the term “capture” somewhat more broadly than is common in
academic literature. Influenced by public choice theory, the term usually refers to the capture of the
regulatory process by well-organized, narrowly focused interest groups with a large stake in the
regulatory outcome, such that the resulting rules benefit these groups at the expense of “the public.” See
generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL. J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3
(1971) (proposing a capture theory of the regulatory process). In this Article, we use the term to refer to
a continuum of behavior ranging from capture in this narrow sense—including through the use of
corrupt payments to government officials—to the formation of alliances between business and political
elites that engender convergence between the fortunes of a specific firm or industry and the government’s goals and priorities. Depending on the specific type of behavior involved, these alliances may
have a variety of consequences for public policy, such as misallocation of capital or limited market
competition; they may also create “national champions” or promote economic development by generating high-powered incentives for China’s managerial elites. See infra Part II.
10. See Michael Forsythe, Alibaba’s I.P.O. Could Be a Bonanza for the Scions of Chinese Leaders,
N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2014, 8:16 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/20/alibabas-i-p-o-could-bea-bonanza-for-the-scions-of-chinese-leaders.
11. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2004);
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED
ENTERPRISES (2005).
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markets in which both SOEs and POEs participate.12 Given the growing importance of Chinese firms of all ownership types to the global economy, if Chinese
SOEs and POEs under the current political climate are not significantly distinguishable in terms of state access, influence, and privileges, these widespread
policy assumptions must be reexamined.
The rise of Chinese state capitalism poses challenges not only for policy
makers, but also for courts, administrative agencies, and dispute settlement
tribunals around the world. In grappling with the complex relationships between
Chinese firms and the Chinese state, these institutions have often resorted to
ownership of enterprise as a means of demarcating the boundary of the state.
We explore the problems associated with this ownership bias in several areas of
economic regulation, including the antitrust, anticorruption, and antisubsidy
regimes.13
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explores and undermines two
parallel, faulty assumptions that are fostered by overattention to the public or
private character of corporate ownership in China: First, that the Chinese state
exerts nearly unbridled control over SOEs and has free reign to use these firms
as tools of government policy, both domestically and abroad. Second, that large
“private” firms in China are autonomous actors operating outside the mechanisms of Chinese state capitalism. Part II explains the dynamics of capture in
the Chinese economy, in which firms of all ownership types face a choice:
Grow and prosper by nestling up to the state and demonstrating the capacity to
deliver on key party-state objectives, or seek autonomy from the state and risk
being marginalized. As noted, looking beyond ownership has important implications for theory, policy, and law. Part III explores the implications across all
three realms that follow from our analysis.
I. THE OWNERSHIP BIAS
Although ownership of enterprise is a natural starting point for analysis of
Chinese corporate governance, focusing on the SOE–POE dichotomy fosters
two assumptions that skew analysis of Chinese state capitalism and may lead
policy makers astray. In this Part, we explore and unsettle these assumptions.
Neither theory nor practice suggests that the Chinese state “controls” SOEs to
the degree its equity ownership would indicate. At the same time, however, it is
misleading to view “private” firms in China as insulated from the state in ways
that set them wholly apart from SOEs. Rather, the human agents managing
Chinese SOEs and POEs respond in similar fashion to their institutional environ-

12. See OECD, COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY, supra note 4, at 9 (“Due to their privileged position SOEs
may negatively affect competition and it is therefore important to ensure that, to the greatest extent
possible consistent with their public service responsibilities, they are subject to similar competition
disciplines as private enterprises.” (emphasis omitted)).
13. See infra section III.C.
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ment, fostering close ties to party-state organs, seeking state largesse, and
resisting government policies that are not in their interests.
Before elaborating, we begin with a foundational point: Even the labels
“SOE” and “POE” are misleading because the boundary between state and
private ownership of enterprise is often blurred in contemporary China.
A. BLURRED BOUNDARY BETWEEN SOES AND POES

In all economies, the boundary between public and private ownership of
enterprise is more porous than conventional analysis assumes because the state
retains control rights over firms even in the absence of ownership interests.14
These state control rights are typically obtained through taxation, regulation,
and subsidization.15 The causes of and response to the 2008–2009 financial
crisis in the United States illustrate that even in countries where private ownership of enterprise has strong ideological and historical roots, the boundary
between government control and private control can be blurry16 and susceptible
to change.17
The boundary between public and private enterprises is even more blurred in
China, a country with a long tradition of state dominance in the economy,
underdeveloped legal institutions, and relatively inchoate conceptions of property rights. In practice, the ownership types of many firms in China are
ambiguous. For example, one of the main drivers of China’s economic miracle
during the 1980s and the early 1990s was the emergence of the so-called
non-state firms, whose share of national industrial output increased from twentytwo percent in 1978 to forty-two percent in 1993.18 Many of the non-state firms
were “collectively owned”—that is, ostensibly owned by all residents in a
community—yet none of the residents possessed the exclusive rights of owner-

14. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1145, 1154 (1998).
15. See id.
16. In the United States, “[d]istinctions between the governmental and private sectors are especially
blurred with respect to a category of organization known as ‘government-sponsored enterprises’
(GSE).” KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30533, THE QUASI GOVERNMENT: HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS WITH BOTH GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS 7 (2011). Typically, GSEs are
privately owned but enjoy implicit government guarantees of obligations. See id. at 8. The two
best-known GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were placed into government conservatorship at the
height of the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Id. at 10.
17. During the 2008–2009 financial crisis, even icons of capitalism like General Motors did not
escape government encroachment. In March 2009, in what was described as a “milestone in the state’s
intervention in the economy,” “[t]he Obama administration used the threat of withholding more bailout
money to force out General Motors Corp. Chief Executive Rick Wagoner.” Neil King Jr. & John D.
Stoll, Government Forces Out Wagoner at GM, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 30, 2009, 11:59 PM ET), http://online.
wsj.com/news/articles/SB123836090755767077. In June 2009, the U.S. government acquired a sixtypercent ownership stake in General Motors as part of a “government-orchestrated” bankruptcy process.
Neil King Jr. & Sharon Terlep, GM Collapses into Government’s Arms, WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2009, 12:01
AM ET), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124385428627671889.
18. Che & Qian, supra note 5, at 467.

672

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 103:665

ship associated with traditional property rights theories.19 One scholar has
theorized that these collectively owned firms represent an arrangement in which
private entrepreneurs choose to have local governments as the owner of the
otherwise private firms as a response to a market environment in which business
transactions are easily blocked by government regulations.20 Another scholar
has argued that these collectively owned firms were in fact privately owned and
operated and were registered as collectively owned only because, at the time,
there was no legal framework for the registration of private firms.21
With the adoption of the Chinese Company Law in 1994, private entrepreneurs gained the ability to register their firms as POEs,22 but the state also
increasingly participated in the ownership of corporate shares. It did so not only
through “wholly state-owned entities,”23 but also through mixed-ownership
entities, where the ownership and management of the firms are shared among
state and private shareholders. In 1997, China announced a massive program to
privatize all but the largest SOEs under the slogan of “‘grasp the large, let go of
the small’ (zhuada fangxiao).”24 In practice, however, the newly privatized
SOEs did not become private firms as that term is commonly understood in the
privatization context–that is, firms in which the state has no equity ownership;
instead, they became firms with mixed ownership.25 It was estimated that as of
2003, mixed-ownership firms accounted for forty percent of China’s GDP.26
Some of the best-known Chinese firms, such as Haier, TCL, and Lenovo, are
mixed-ownership firms.27 In particular, publicly listed firms in China are typi-

19. Martin L. Weitzman & Chenggang Xu, Chinese Township-Village Enterprises as Vaguely
Defined Cooperatives, 18 J. COMP. ECON. 121, 131–32 (1994). These collectively owned non-state firms
are also referred to as Township-Village Enterprises (TVEs). See, e.g., id. at 121; Che & Qian, supra
note 5, at 467.
20. See David D. Li, A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition Economies: The Case of
the Chinese Non-State Sector, 23 J. COMP. ECON. 1, 8–15 (1996).
21. See, e.g., Yasheng Huang, How Did China Take Off?, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 147, 154 (2012).
22. See id. at 154–55. For an overview of China’s Company Law and the corporate governance
issues arising under it, see Donald C. Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview, 14 CHINA
ECON. REV. 494 (2003). The Company Law was enacted primarily to facilitate reforms of traditional
SOEs, and the need of non-state actors occupied a very low priority in the minds of state policymakers.
See id. at 495–96.
23. The Chinese government formed a number of state-owned company groups and holds 100% of
their shares through the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC).
See Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 8, at 700.
24. LENG JING, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REFORM IN CHINA’S TRANSITION ECONOMY 50
(2009).
25. This was because of ownership restrictions on the actual implementation of privatization, such as
the requirement that publicly listed former SOEs maintain a controlling state-ownership stake. See id. at
51.
26. Hùnhé Suǒyǒuzhì Jıngjì Yı̌ Zhàn 40%—5–10 Nián Hòu Jiâng Dádào 80% [Mixed-Ownership
Sector Accounts for 40% of Economy—To Hit 80% in 5–10 Years], XINHUÁ WǍNG [NEW CHINA NET]
(Nov. 25, 2003, 14:15:17), http://www.southcn.com/news/china/zgkx/200311250786.htm.
27. Ming Zeng & Peter J. Williamson, The Hidden Dragons, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 2003, at 92, 94.
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cally of the mixed-ownership type.28 Mixed ownership has also become an
important ownership form among some of China’s central SOE groups at the
subsidiary level. For example, almost all of the thirty-four subsidiaries of China
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) are mixed-ownership firms with
an average state-share percentage ranging from forty to sixty-five percent.29
Mixed ownership is set to become a more pervasive ownership form for central
SOEs given that the CPC Third Plenum in 2013 made mixed ownership a goal
of SOE reforms.30
Classifying the mixed-ownership firms as SOEs or POEs presents a challenge. When the percentage of state shares in a mixed-ownership firm is
relatively large, the firm could, at least in theory, still be classified as an SOE.
But classification gets more difficult as the percentage of state shares decreases.
In some cases, the ownership structure of a mixed-ownership firm becomes so
fragmented that none of its state or non-state shareholders holds a controlling
interest in the firm. An example is Ping An Insurance (Group) Co. of China Ltd.
Table 1 shows the top ten shareholders of Ping An by type and their respective
ownership percentages.31
Ping An’s 2012 annual report notes that “[t]he shareholding structure of the
Company is relatively scattered. There is no controlling shareholder, nor de
facto controller.”32 Because of its fragmented ownership structure, it is difficult
to classify Ping An as an SOE or POE based on equity ownership alone. The
inconsistent classification of Ping An by outside observers illustrates the problem. In 2012, Ping An was treated as a POE when it was included in the Fortune
Global 500 ranking of the world’s largest firms.33 Yet in the same year, Ping An

28. The three main categories of shareholders of publicly listed firms in China are the state,
institutional shareholders (also known as legal person investors), and individual investors, each holding
about one-third of the total outstanding shares. See Lihui Tian & Saul Estrin, Retained State Shareholding in Chinese PLCs: Does Government Ownership Reduce Corporate Value? 8 (Inst. for the Study of
Labor, Discussion Paper No. 1493, 2005), available at ftp://ftp.iza.org/dps/dp1493.pdf; see also
Xiaonian Xu & Yan Wang, Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Companies, 10 CHINA ECON. REV. 75, 80 (1999) (analyzing the ownership structure of Chinese publicly listed
firms in the early 1990s).
29. See Wáng Rùnqiû: Qı̂chéng Yângqı̌ Gǎizhì—Dàlì Fâzhǎn Hùnhé Suǒyǒuzhì Jı̂ngjì [Wang Runqiu: Seventy Percent of Central SOEs Undergoing Structural Reforms—Promoting the Development of
Mixed-Ownership Economy], RÉNMÍN WǍNG [PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE] (Nov. 26, 2012, 08:21), http://
dangjian.people.com.cn/n/2012/1126/c117092-19693335.html.
30. See U.K. Foreign & Commonwealth Office, China Economy: China’s SOE Reform Since the
Third Plenum—August 2014 (Aug. 7, 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chinaeconomy-chinas-soe-reform-since-the-third-plenum-august-2014/china-economy-chinas-soe-reform-sincethe-third-plenum-august-2014.
31. See PING AN INS. (GRP.) CO. OF CHINA, LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 83 (2012), available at
http://www.irasia.com/listco/hk/pingan/annual/ar106101-e_101.pdf. We reformatted the data in the Ping
An 2012 annual report by grouping shareholders by ownership type.
32. Id. at 84.
33. See Zhôu Zhǎnhóng, 2012 Nián Shìjiè 500 Qiáng Páihángbǎng Shàng de Zhôngguó Gôngsı̂
[Chinese Companies on 2012 Fortune Global 500], CÁIFÙ ZHO NGGUÓ [FORTUNE CHINA] (July 9, 2012),
http://www.fortunechina.com/fortune500/c/2012-07/09/content_106895.htm.
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Table 1: Top Ten Shareholders of Ping An Insurance
Type
State

Shareholder
Shenzhen Investment Holdings Co., Ltd.

6.08%

Shum Yip Group Ltd.

2.27%

Domestic Non-State Yuan Trust Investment Co., Ltd.

4.80%

Linzhi New Horse Investment Development Co., Ltd.

4.03%

Linzhi Jingao Industrial Development Co., Ltd.

3.46%

Shenzhen Wuxin Yufu Industrial Co., Ltd.

2.22%

Gongbujiangda Jiangnan Industrial Development Co., Ltd. 1.76%
Foreign

The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd.

7.76%

HSBC Insurance Holdings Ltd.

4.58%

All Gain Trading Ltd.

1.04%

did not appear on an influential ranking of China’s top 500 private companies,34
suggesting that it may not have been considered a POE by the domestic
organization that conducted the ranking.35
For some mixed-ownership firms, taxonomy is difficult because of the way
they are managed. A prominent example is ZTE Corporation (ZTE), China’s
second largest telecommunications equipment manufacturer and the subject of a
U.S. House Committee investigation in 2012.36 ZTE’s shares are listed on both
the Shenzhen and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges. ZTE’s largest shareholder is
ZTE Holdings, which with 30.76% of ZTE’s shares37 might be considered
ZTE’s controlling shareholder.38 The shares of ZTE Holdings in turn are held by

34. See 2012 Zhôngguó Mı́nyı́ng Qı̌yè 500 Qiáng Bǎngdân Fâbù [2012 Ranking of China’s Top 500
Private Companies Released], XINLÀNG CÁIJING [SINA FIN. & ECON.] (Aug. 30, 2012, 16:12), http://finance.
sina.com.cn/hy/20120830/161213002302.shtml. The ranking was conducted by All-China Federation of
Industry and Commerce.
35. In 2013, Ping An did not appear on the same ranking of top 500 private firms conducted by the
same organization, despite the fact that its revenues exceeded those of the top ranked firm, Suning
Electronics Group. Chinese media observed that obviously the organization that conducted the ranking
did not consider Ping An a private firm. See Mı́nqı̌ 500 Qiáng Mı́ngdân Chûlú: Zhôngguó Pı́ng’ân
Wèihé Luòxuǎn? [Ranking of Top 500 Private Firms Released: Why Is China Ping An Not on the List?],
XINHUÁ WǍNG [NEW CHINA NET] (Aug. 30, 2013, 15:59:30), http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2013-08/
30/c_125285188.htm.
36. See MIKE ROGERS & C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, H.R. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 112TH CONG., INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES HUAWEI AND ZTE (2012), available at http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/
intelligence.house.gov/files/Huawei-ZTE%20Investigative%20Report%20(FINAL).pdf.
37. See infra Figure 1.
38. ZTE CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 98–100 (2012) [hereinafter ZTE 2012 ANNUAL REPORT],
available at http://wwwen.zte.com.cn/en/about/investor_relations/corporate_report/annual_report/201304/
P020130414667427851218.pdf. ZTE Holdings is also known as Zhongxingxin Telecommunication
Equipment Ltd. Co., or Zhongxingxin for short. Under both Chinese and Hong Kong law, thirty percent
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Figure 1: Ownership Structure of ZTE Corporation
Xi’an Microelectronics (34%), Aerospace Guangyu (17%), and Zhongxing
WXT (49%).39 Xi’an Microelectronics and Aerospace Guangyu are both SOEs.40
State-owned entities, therefore, control 51% of ZTE Holdings. Perhaps for this
reason ZTE’s 2012 annual report lists the ownership type of ZTE Holdings as
“state-owned.”41 According to the website of ZTE Holdings, it is one of the key
national SOEs designated by the State Council.42 The third shareholder of ZTE

is the point at which a shareholder is considered to have acquired a large enough stake in a publicly
listed company to trigger a mandatory bid rule, a common mechanism for protecting minority
shareholders against an unfair acquisition by the controlling shareholder. Under the mandatory bid rule,
a shareholder intending to surpass thirty percent share ownership is required to make an offer to
purchase the shares of all other shareholders. See Shǎngshı́ Gòngsı̂ Shǒugôu Guânlì Bànfǎ [Rules on
Mergers and Acquisitions Involving Publicly Listed Companies] (promulgated by the Sec. Regulatory
Comm’n, May 17, 2006, effective Sept. 1, 2006), Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
Order No. 35, art. 47, available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2006-08/02/content_352370.htm; SEC. &
FUTURES COMM’N, THE CODES ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS AND SHARE REPURCHASES Rule 26.1 (1992),
available at http://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/pdf/sfcRegulatoryHandbook/EN_H622.pdf.
39. ZTE 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 38, at 100.
40. Xi’an Microelectronics is a “large state-owned research institute.” Id. Aerospace Guangyu is a
wholly state-owned enterprise. See id. at 100–01.
41. See id. at 98.
42. Gôngsı̂ Jiǎnjiè [Company Overview], ZTE HOLDINGS, http://www.zteholdings.com/about-intro.
htm [hereinafter ZTE Overview] (stating in Chinese).
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Holdings, Zhongxing WXT (also known as Zhongxingweixiantong), is a private
firm owned by a group of individuals, of whom the founder, Hou Weigui, holds
the largest percentage (18%).43 According to the website of ZTE Holdings, it
was the first firm in China to adopt a state-owned, privately managed model in
1993.44 Under this so-called ZTE model, the majority state shareholders contractually authorize the minority private shareholders to assume sole responsibility
for managing the firm, subject only to the requirement that the state shareholders be guaranteed a minimum rate of return. Under the ZTE model, therefore, a
firm is an SOE from the standpoint of equity ownership, but a POE from the
standpoint of management.45
The preceding discussion suggests that classifying Chinese firms according to
ownership is problematic. These problems are greatly compounded by the
reality we explore in the next two sections of this Part: Equity ownership alone
reveals very little about the degree of control the Chinese state exercises over
Chinese firms, be they SOEs or POEs.
B. STATE “OWNERSHIP”

By simple syllogism, the state “owns” an SOE. This is literally true in China:
The State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC),
a government agency that plays the role of both a holding company and a
supervisory authority, holds 100 percent of the shares of the parent companies
of each of the approximately 115 central state-owned business groups.46 While
the business groups may contain one or more entities whose shares are listed on
a domestic or foreign stock exchange and held by minority private investors,
SASAC, which reports to the State Council (China’s cabinet), is the ultimate
controlling shareholder atop the business groups. At least formally, this makes
SASAC “the world’s largest controlling shareholder.”47
Straightforward application of agency analysis, however, points out the problem with assuming that state ownership of a corporate enterprise means unbridled state control over the firm. Berle and Means long ago identified the
separation of ownership and control in large firms as a threat to private property,
because it produces a misalignment of incentives between shareholders (own-

43. See Su n Jia xià, Zhôngxìng Xì Dìguó Tújı̌ng: Hóu Wéiguì Yàowéi Zhônggâocéng Xúnzhǎo Lìyì
Fçnpèi Lùjìng [Future of the ZTE Empire: Hou Weigui Seeks Path to Allocate Benefits and Interests
Among Mid- and High-Level Executives], FÈNGHUÁNGWǍNG CÁIJING [PHOENIX NET FIN.] (Nov. 28, 2012,
04:30), http://finance.ifeng.com/stock/ssgs/20121128/7356422.shtml.
44. ZTE Overview, supra note 42.
45. See Eric Harwit, Building China’s Telecommunications Network: Industrial Policy and the Role
of Chinese State-Owned, Foreign and Private Domestic Enterprises, 190 CHINA Q. 311, 325 (2007).
46. Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 8, at 700. Prior to the establishment of SASAC in 2003, China had
an ad hoc institutional structure for overseeing SOEs, with SOEs being essentially production bureaus
under the direct control of government ministries. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD
ECONOMY SURVEYS: CHINA 109 (2010).
47. Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 8, at 700 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ers) and managers.48 This problem, which carries the economic label “agency
costs,” remains the central concern of corporate governance regimes
everywhere.49
Agency costs, of course, can also jeopardize public property. Majority or
even 100 percent ownership of a firm’s equity by the state does not necessarily
solve the misalignment of incentives between the SOE’s “owners” and managers. Rather, it may multiply the agency problem.50 The SOE managers must be
monitored by an agent of the state, which in turn must be monitored.51 In the
case of Chinese SOEs, this chain of monitors does not lead to an ultimate
principal, because the theoretical owner of the SOEs—the citizenry of China—is
too dispersed and powerless to play a meaningful monitoring role.52
The Chinese state does exert significant political control over senior executives of large SOEs.53 In particular, the Party and SASAC routinely rotate senior
SOE executives among different business groups in the same sector.54 Topdown political control, however, does not fully eliminate agency costs. To meet
its governance goals, the Chinese state has to delegate a significant amount of
discretion to its local agents and accommodate their special interests to ensure
their participation and cooperation.55 The frequent rotations of senior SOE
executives may be a reflection of the weakness, rather than the strength, of
top-down political control, because they suggest that the state lacks other
effective means of keeping SOE executives in check.56 This is all the more
48. See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1. Jensen and Meckling developed the concept of
agency costs as a conflict of interests between managers and shareholders. See generally Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 2.
49. The location and severity of agency problems, however, will differ across countries and
corporate ownership structures. See Roe, supra note 1, at 1977–89 (discussing advantages of corporate
ownership structures in Japan and Germany in reducing agency costs).
50. See Estrin & Pérotin, supra note 3, at 61–62.
51. See Clarke, supra note 22, at 499.
52. See id. However, as Clarke observes, the absence of an effective ultimate principal is not unique
to state ownership; many other institutions such as nonprofit organizations and industrial foundations
also lack an ultimate human “owner.” Id.
53. In China, the appointment of senior executives at large SOEs takes place in a highly institutionalized sharing arrangement between the Communist Party and SASAC. At the largest fifty or so SOEs,
top executives are appointed and evaluated by the Organization Department of the Party’s Central
Committee, and less senior executives are appointed by the Party Building Bureau of SASAC.
Appointments and evaluations of top executives at the remaining SASAC-supervised SOEs are made
by SASAC only. See Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 8, at 737–38.
54. See id. at 740. In recent years, such rotations have been conducted in the telecommunications
sector (2004 and 2007), the energy sector (2008), and the petroleum sectors (2011). See id.
55. See Linda Chelan Li, Central-Provincial Relations: Beyond Compliance Analysis, in CHINA
REVIEW 1998, at 157, 160 (Joseph Y.S. Cheng ed., 1998) (“Economic decentralization builds in vested
interests among a larger group of officials in the policy processes and, thus, ensures a higher level of
participation and openness in the political system than when both political and economic resources are
concentrated at the top of the hierarchy in the hands of a few.”).
56. A similar argument has been made regarding an analogous relationship: the relationship between
central and local government officials. The central government frequently rotates senior provincial
officials—every three or four years according to one tally. See YASHENG HUANG, INFLATION AND
INVESTMENT CONTROLS IN CHINA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CENTRAL–LOCAL RELATIONS DURING THE
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likely given the enormous size and complexity of China’s SOEs. At the national
level, SASAC is formally responsible for exercising the interests of the state as
an investor in over 100 massive SOE business groups, some of which have over
100 downstream subsidiaries.57 How likely is it that a group of bureaucrats in
Beijing actually controls such a vast business empire?
Policy choices made in the transition from communism to market economies
compound the agency problem in SOEs. Efforts to revitalize the state-owned
sector in many formerly communist countries, including China, included delegation of managerial discretion to SOE insiders to varying degrees.58 In China, the
delegation of authority has been an overarching theme of SOE reforms since the
late 1970s.59 As a result of such policies throughout the transition economies,
“irreversible jurisdictional authority” was conferred on managers within their
own SOEs.60 These reforms, together with privatization of SOEs into the hands
of entrenched managers, led to rampant insider control.61
Thus, in theory, the sheer size and complexity of the SOE sector, and the
obvious consequences of economic transition policies in China suggest far
greater managerial autonomy from the state in the SOE sector than a focus on
ownership alone would suggest. The relatively attenuated nature of the Chinese
state’s control over SOEs is evidenced in a variety of ways, discussed below.
The evidence we present is of necessity circumstantial, but cumulatively, in
combination with the realities we have just described, it casts considerable
doubt on conventional wisdom.
1. The State Collects Little or No Dividends from SOEs
Equity owners have a residual claim on the cash flows generated by the
corporation. Residual claimant status is a key theoretical reason why equity
owners, as opposed to contractual claimants such as bondholders or employees,
are legally vested with the right to elect the board of directors. Although in
theory the state is entitled to all of the SOEs’ after-tax profits, the Chinese
government has historically collected little or no dividends from SOEs.62 In

REFORM ERA 115 (1996). While such rotations confirm that central government officials have discretion
to hire and fire provincial officials, they might be the last major instrument the central government has
to deal with growing provincial power. See Li, supra note 55, at 161.
57. See Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 8, at 733, for a chart illustrating the byzantine corporate
structure of a single national SOE under SASAC’s supervision.
58. See Masahiko Aoki, Controlling Insider Control: Issues of Corporate Governance in Transition
Economies, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES: INSIDER CONTROL AND THE ROLE OF
BANKS 3, 7–12 (Masahiko Aoki & Hyung-Ki Kim eds., 1995).
59. See Wentong Zheng, Transplanting Antitrust in China: Economic Transition, Market Structure,
and State Control, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 643, 662–63 (2010).
60. Aoki, supra note 58, at 8.
61. See id.
62. During the SOE reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s, the government allowed SOEs to retain
an individually negotiated percentage of their profits, which could be used to finance benefits and
awards paid to managers and employees. A 1994 tax reform set a uniform rate of tax on SOE profits;
any remaining profits belonged to the SOEs. See WORLD BANK, SOE DIVIDENDS: HOW MUCH AND TO

2015]

STATE CAPITALISM AND THE CHINESE FIRM

679

2007, the State Council required central SOEs (those under SASAC supervision) to begin paying dividends ranging from 0%–10%.63 In 2011, the SOE
dividend rates were increased by 5% across the board, to 5%–15%.64 The CPC
Third Plenum in 2013 set a goal of increasing the SOE dividend rate to 30% by
the year 2020.65 These rates, however, are still below the average dividend rates
paid by established industrial firms in the United States (50%–60%) and the
average dividend rate paid by SOEs in five developed economies (33%).66
Moreover, the dividend rates paid by central SOEs to the government in its
capacity as shareholder are lower than those paid to private shareholders by
Chinese SOEs listed in Hong Kong.67 Most importantly, perhaps, virtually all of
the dividends paid by SOEs to the government are eventually recycled back to
them: More than 92% of the dividends paid by central SOEs to the government
in 2012 were remitted back to the SOEs in the form of subsidies.68
From an agency perspective, these dividend policies have a number of
negative implications. First, it is difficult to justify maintaining a large SOE
sector on behalf of the citizens—the ultimate principals—if profits from the
enterprises are not remitted to the state. Second, low dividend payouts to the
government and heavy recycling of profits back to the SOEs in the form of
subsidies increase free cash flow, which generates additional agency slack
between SOE managers and the government in its role as owner–investor. By
increasing the amount of cash at the SOE managers’ disposal, these policies

WHOM? 2 (2005), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/
WDSP/IB/2010/09/17/000334955_20100917050418/Rendered/PDF/566510WP0SOE1E10Box353729
B01PUBLIC1.pdf. But between 1994 and 2007, the state collected no dividends from SOEs. See
Nicholas Borst, SOE Dividends and Economic Rebalancing, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (May 11,
2012, 12:28 PM), http://www.piie.com/blogs/china/?p⫽1258.
63. Borst, supra note 62.
64. See id.
65. See NARGIZA SALIDJANOVA & IACOB KOCH-WESER, U.S.–CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N,
THIRD PLENUM ECONOMIC REFORM PROPOSALS: A SCORECARD 3 (2013), available at http://origin.www.uscc.
gov/sites/default/files/Research/Backgrounder_Third%20Plenum%20Economic%20Reform%20
Proposals—A%20Scorecard%20(2).pdf.
66. See WORLD BANK, EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINE WITH ADEQUATE AUTONOMY: THE DIRECTION FOR FURTHER
REFORM OF CHINA’S SOE DIVIDEND POLICY 13, 23–30 (2010), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/03/02/000333038_20100302031054/Rendered/
PDF/532540ESW0P11310final0Nov27020090En.pdf. The five developed economies discussed by the
report are New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and France. See id.
67. See id. at 35.
68. See Qùnián Yângqı̌ Shàngjiǎo Hónglì Yòng Yú Mı́nshcng Bùzú 8%, Dàbù Liúhuı́ Nèibù [Less
than 8% of the Dividends Central SOEs Paid Last Year Were Spent on People’s Livelihood, Most
Remitted Back], ZHO NGGUÓ XINWÉN WǍNG [CHINA NEWS NET] (Mar. 10, 2013, 08:41), http://finance.
chinanews.com/cj/2013/03-10/4629550.shtml. For a general discussion of the recycling of SOE dividends, see John Foley, Dividend Reform Won’t Fix China SOE Money-Go-Round, REUTERS (Feb. 6,
2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/breakingviews/2013/02/06/dividend-reform-wont-fix-china-soe-moneygo-round.
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facilitate managerial misbehavior in the form of perk consumption and empire
building.69
2. Executive Compensation Practices at SOEs Suggest Limited State Control
over Managers
Theory and cross-country experience suggest that concentrated ownership
alleviates agency problems in setting managerial pay.70 Yet executive compensation practices at Chinese SOEs, with concentrated ownership in the hands of the
state, have posed problems throughout the reform era, suggesting limited state
control over SOE managers.
During the initial phase of market-oriented reforms of Chinese SOEs, individual state-owned firms were allowed to base executive compensation on firm
performance.71 The practice led to significant disparities in pay levels across
SOEs. To address this perceived problem, several ministries of the State Council in 2009 introduced a scheme that capped executive compensation at the
central SOEs overseen by SASAC at twenty times average employee compensation.72 Putting aside the question of whether this is an optimal compensation
formula, such a system ostensibly suggests a significant degree of state control
over managerial incentives.
But beneath the surface of state control over executive pay lies a vast domain
of managerial autonomy. A common form of private-benefit extraction by SOE
managers is the practice of “on-duty consumption,” a catchall category of
perquisites, expense accounts, and side payments that often significantly exceed
a manager’s formal compensation, which is regulated by SASAC in cooperation
with senior Party organs.73 The scale and pervasiveness of these practices74

69. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76
AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986). For discussions of the empire-building incentives of China’s SOE
managers, see Angela Huyue Zhang, Foreign Direct Investment from China: Sense and Sensibility, 34
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 395 (2014).
70. Jensen and Meckling’s agency analysis suggests that executive pay would be structured differently in the dispersed shareholding context as compared to concentrated ownership regimes. See Jensen
& Meckling, supra note 2, at 313–19; see also Niamh Moloney, The EU and Executive Pay: Managing
Harmonization Risks, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EXECUTIVE PAY 466, 468–69 (Randall S. Thomas &
Jennifer G. Hill eds., 2012) (exploring divergence in pay practices among dispersed and blockholder
regimes in the EU).
71. See Theodore Groves et al., Autonomy and Incentives in Chinese State Enterprises, 109 Q.J.
ECON. 183, 183 (1994).
72. See Guóqı̌ Gâoguǎn Xı̂nchóu Shàngxiàn: 20 Bèi Zhı́gông Pı́ngjûn Gôngzı̂ [Pay for Senior SOE
Executives: Capped at 20 Times Average Employee Pay], ZHO NGGUÓ XINWÉN WǍNG [CHINA NEWS NET]
(Sept. 25, 2009, 09:13), http://www.chinanews.com/cj/cj-gncj/news/2009/09-25/1885412.shtml.
73. See generally Shrouded in Mystery: Chinese Executive Compensation and the Numbers Behind
the Numbers, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 14, 2012), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/arabic/article.
cfm?articleid⫽2824.
74. A study showed that the average on-duty consumption of 1320 listed companies in China
exceeded average executive compensation by two to fifty times, and had been growing over time.
Another study showed that on-duty consumption at China’s SOEs has a significant negative correlation
with company earnings. See id.
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belie the notion that the Chinese government, as a controlling shareholder, is
closely monitoring SOE managers and carefully tailoring incentives to maximize returns on state assets. Rather, these practices suggest a considerable
degree of agency slack between SOE managers and the controlling shareholder.
3. The State Often Fails to Implement Major Operational and Policy Decisions
at SOEs
It is considered good practice for the state to avoid involvement in day-to-day
management of SOEs,75 because government agents generally lack the expertise, information, and incentives necessary to run a commercial enterprise
effectively. At the same time, however, a principal theoretical justification for
the existence of SOEs is to accomplish objectives that, due to market failure,
would otherwise be impossible. From this perspective, it would be anomalous if
the state were unable to implement major operational decisions at SOEs on
issues implicating key state policies. But at times, this is precisely the case in
China.
One example can be found in the government’s failure to prevent SOEs from
investing in the real estate sector. One of the top priorities of the Chinese
government in recent years has been to rein in skyrocketing housing prices.76 In
furtherance of that goal, SASAC in March 2010 ordered seventy-eight central
SOEs whose main business was not real estate, but which had entered the real
estate sector, to withdraw.77 Yet almost three years later, as of December 2012,
less than one-quarter of the affected SOEs had complied with the SASAC
order.78 Many of the SOEs subject to the order actually expanded their real
estate businesses during this period.79
Another example is the recent setback in the Chinese government’s efforts to
restructure central SOEs. Over the years, one of the government’s key policies
has been to consolidate the SOE sector to address market segmentation, to
implement China’s long-term SOE strategy, and to promote China’s national
champions.80 In accordance with these objectives, the number of central SOEs
overseen by SASAC has been reduced through mergers to 121 in 2011, down

75. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 13 (2005).
76. See Keith Bradsher, Government Policies Cool China’s Real Estate Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/11/business/global/government-policies-cool-china-real-estateboom.html.
77. See Guózı̂wìi: 78 Jiâ Yângqı̌ Jiâng Tuìchû Fángdìchǎn Shìchǎng [SASAC: 78 Central SOEs to
Withdraw from the Real Estate Market], XINHUÁ WǍNG [NEW CHINA NET] (Mar. 18, 2010, 15:40:32),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2010-03/18/content_13194385.htm.
78. See Yângqı̌ Sânnián Wèi “Tuìfáng”: 78 Jiâ Tuìchû Bùzú 1/4 [Three Years Later, Central SOEs
Still Not Withdrawn from Real Estate Market: 78 (Less than a Quarter) Withdrew], XINHUÁ WǍNG [NEW
CHINA NET] (Dec. 5, 2012, 08:55:03), http://news.xinhuanet.com/house/2012-12/05/c_124048485.htm.
79. See id.
80. See Zheng, supra note 59, at 714–15.
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from 196 in 2003.81 SASAC seeks to reduce the number of central SOEs to
below 100.82 To achieve this goal, SASAC’s original plan was to package the
assets of about two dozen smaller central SOEs whose businesses were not
complementary into a holding company called Guoxin Assets Management
Co.83 However, the plan reportedly met fierce resistance from the target SOEs,
particularly those that had acquired monopoly status in niche industries.84 The
holding company was eventually established in December 2010 but with no
initial assets.85 One year after its establishment, the holding company had
acquired only one central SOE, as opposed to the two dozen contemplated by
the government’s original plan.86 Since then, it has acquired the state-held
shares of Shanghai Bell, a telecommunications equipment manufacturer that has
lost out in competition with other telecommunications equipment firms.87
4. The State Influences SOE Behavior Principally in Its Role as a Regulator,
Not as a Controlling Shareholder
To the extent that the state does successfully intervene in SOE operations to
achieve policy objectives, it typically does so as a regulator, not as a controlling
shareholder.
For example, the Chinese government has been waging an anticorruption
campaign since Xi Jinping took over the Party leadership in November 2012.88
One focus of the anticorruption campaign is to prohibit the consumption of
expensive liquors by government officials. Demand for the products of two
prestigious Chinese liquor firms, Maotai and Wuliangye, both SOEs, plummeted as a result of the campaign.89 Starting in December 2012, some distributors of Maotai and Wuliangye offered deep price discounts to win sales. Maotai
81. See Guózı̂wěi Fùzhǔrèn: Yângqı̌ Jiâng Jiǎnshǎo Dào 100 Jiâ Yı̌nèi [SASAC Vice Chairman:
Number of Central SOEs to Be Reduced to Below 100], XINHUÁ WǍNG [NEW CHINA NET] (Jan. 22, 2011,
08:15:56), http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2011-01/22/c_121011135.htm.
82. Id.
83. See “Zhôngtóu Èrhào” Zuìkuài 8 Yuè Guàpái—Bùfèn Yângqı̌ Jùjué Bèi Chóngzǔ [“CIC No. 2”
to Be Established in August at the Earliest—Some Central SOEs Refuse to Be Restructured], TÉNGXÙN
CÁIJING [TENCENT QQ] (Aug. 7, 2010, 02:05), http://finance.qq.com/a/20100807/000569.htm.
84. See id.
85. See SASAC Notice No. 2010-3, available at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2665/13063
724.html.
86. See Chén Yánpéng, Zhôngtóu Èrhào Chénglì Yı̂nián Yèwù Wú Jìnzhǎn—Bèi Yı́ Dìngwèi Bù Qı̂ng
[One Year After Establishment, No Progress at CIC No. 2—Business Scope in Doubt], XINLÀNG CÁIJING
[SINA FIN. & ECON.] (Feb. 18, 2012, 07:36), http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/jrxw/20120218/073611405
303.shtml.
87. See Gǔ Xiǎoyǔ, Guóxı̂n Gôngsı̂ Jicshǒu Shànghǎi Bèi’ı̀r Zhôngfâng Gǔfèn [Guoxin Acquires
Chinese-Held Shares of Shanghai Bell], RÉNMÍN WǍNG [PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE] (Mar. 3, 2012, 14:02
PM), http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/70846/17283754.html. For discussions of competition between
Shanghai Bell and other telecommunications equipment firms, see infra notes 153–154 and accompanying text.
88. See Heng Shao, Tumbling Stock of Luxury Chinese Liquor Company Reflects Strength of
Corruption Clamp-Down, FORBES (Sept. 3, 2013, 6:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/hengshao/2013/
09/03/tumbling-stock-of-luxury-chinese-liquor-company-reflects-strength-of-corruption-clamp-down.
89. See id.
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and Wuliangye responded by setting minimum sales prices for their products
and penalizing distributors that sold below the minimum prices. In response, the
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s price regulator, conducted “interviews” with executives of the firms and warned them of
their violation of China’s Antimonopoly Law, which prohibits the fixing of
resale prices.90 Following the NDRC interviews, Maotai and Wuliangye publicly announced that they would heed the NDRC warning and terminate their
minimum resale price policies.91
The important point about this incident is not that the state intervened, but the
way in which it intervened. The state did not act as the liquor firms’ controlling
shareholder, directing management through the board of directors to change
their pricing policies. It intervened as law enforcer, in the same fashion as if the
firms had been privately owned. This is not in itself negative. The state should
enforce laws neutrally against both SOEs and POEs, and perhaps there were
public policy benefits in acting publicly in a case such as this one. But coupled
with the other evidence of attenuated government control over SOEs, incidents
such as this suggest that the government does not view standard mechanisms of
corporate control as its most effective means of influencing SOE behavior.
C.

“PRIVATE” OWNERSHIP

In the context of Chinese state capitalism, private ownership does not mean
autonomy from the state. In fact, POEs bear striking resemblance to SOEs along
the dimensions typically thought to distinguish state-owned firms from the
private sector: ready access to state power and largesse, proximity to the
regulatory process, and little autonomy from discretionary state intervention in
business judgment. We elaborate below, highlighting several features of Chinese private firms that are taken for granted in SOEs but rarely associated with
POEs: formal membership of top management in party-state organs, large
government subsidies, and extralegal control by the state.
1. Politically Connected Entrepreneurs
As one of us has written elsewhere, SOEs are deeply enmeshed in a larger
system of party-state organs, a phenomenon we called “institutional bridging.”92
These bridges consist of dense, stable networks of relationships fostered through
rotations of managers, personnel exchanges, and the wearing of multiple hats
(on behalf of SOEs, the government, and the Party) by managerial elites in
China.

90. Wǔliángyè Jì Máotái Hòu Bèi Fàgǎiwı̀i Yuctán—Jiâng An Fǎnlǒngduànfǎ Zhěnggǎi [After
Maotai, Wuliangye Interviewed by NDRC—Agreement to Amend Policies Pursuant to Antimonopoly
Law], XINLÀNG CÁIJING [SINA FIN. & ECON.] (Jan. 17, 2013, 17:34), http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/
gsnews/20130117/173414320012.shtml.
91. See id.
92. Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 8, at 708.
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Institutional bridges are also prevalent between state or Party organs and
senior executives of large private enterprises in China. We studied the government affiliations of the founders or de facto controllers of China’s one hundred
largest POEs (by revenue) as ranked by All-China Federation of Industry and
Commerce,93 as well as China’s top ten Internet firms (by revenue)—all
POEs—as ranked by China Internet Association.94 Based on publicly available
information, we identified ninety-five out of the top one hundred private firms
and eight out of the top ten Internet firms whose founder or de facto controller is
currently or formerly a member of central or local party-state organizations such
as People’s Congresses and People’s Political Consultative Conferences.95 Moreover, that no such memberships could be found for founders or de facto
controllers of the rest of the firms does not necessarily mean they lack highlevel political connections. Information about their affiliations simply may not
be publicly available, or their connections to the political establishment may
have purposely been kept informal to avoid suspicion about their firm’s motives, as is likely the case with the founder of Huawei.
Why do private entrepreneurs join these political organs, whose powers are
largely symbolic? One potential explanation is that membership in political
organs signals allegiance to and influence within the party-state—creating and
reinforcing networks with state-linked actors important to a firm’s success, such
as banks, SOEs, and regulators. The signal of influence sent by political
participation may also help ward off potential new market entrants and local
government officials eager to share in the spoils of a lucrative hometown
business. At the same time, widespread membership of successful entrepreneurs
in party-state organizations is indicative of the confluence of interests and a
shared worldview of political and economic elites in China—the “integration of
wealth and power,” in the words of China scholar Bruce Dickson.96 As the Wall
Street Journal reported of the Twitter-like enterprise, Tencent Holdings, “The
company is politically as well as technologically savvy. . . . Tencent’s chief
executive, Pony Ma, joined China’s nearly powerless but symbolically significant parliament, a sign the company had become part of the Chinese
establishment.”97

93. See 2013 Zho ngguó Mínqı̌ 500 Qiáng Jie xiǎo Su níng Liánxiǎng Huáwèi Ju Qián Sa n [2013
Ranking of China’s Top 500 Privately Owned Companies Unveiled], XINLÀNG CÁIJING [SINA FIN. &
ECON.] (Aug. 29, 2013, 10:18), http://finance.sina.com.cn/leadership/mroll/20130829/101816602059.
shtml.
94. See 2014 Nián Zhôngguó Hùliánwǎng Bǎiqiáng Qı̌yè Bǎngdân Jicxiǎo [2014 Ranking of China’s
Top 100 Internet Companies Unveiled], SOHU IT (Aug. 28, 2014, 18:09:20), http://it.sohu.com/
20140828/n403865758.shtml.
95. See infra Appendices I–II.
96. Bruce J. Dickson, Integrating Wealth and Power in China: The Communist Party’s Embrace of
the Private Sector, 192 CHINA Q. 827, 827–28 (2007).
97. Bob Davis, China’s Top-Down Take on Innovation, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2013, 4:18 PM ET),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304795804579099640843773148.
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2. Government Support for Private Firms
The Chinese state provides extensive support to SOEs—$310 billion in
nominal terms between 1985 and 2005 according to a recent estimate.98 But
SOEs are not the only firms supported by the state. Subsidies to large, fastgrowing private firms are widespread and can constitute a significant portion of
a company’s net profits.99 Privately owned Geely Automobile, for example,
received subsidies totaling $141 million in 2011, over half of its net profits for
the year.100 When Geely acquired Volvo from Ford in 2010, much of the $1.5
billion purchase price was financed by local governments in northeast China
and the Shanghai area.101 Huawei, China’s largest telecommunications equipment maker, provides another example. Huawei’s shares are held by its employees under an arrangement resembling an Employee Stock Ownership Plan.102
Yet analysts have suggested that Huawei is viewed by the Chinese government
as a “national champion,” and it receives major funding from state banks.103 As
one commentator notes, “The irony that the SOE [ZTE] turned to equity
markets while the private company [Huawei] relied on state funds indicates the
blurred lines between the public and private sectors in China’s creation of
industries considered to be strategic.”104
3. Extralegal Control of Private Firms
The line between state and private ownership of enterprise in China is blurred
not only due to ambiguous ownership structures of the kind discussed in section
I.A above, but also because the state exercises significant extralegal control
rights over private firms. To be sure, in every economy corporations are subject
to regulations that dilute the control rights of corporate equity owners.105 State
encroachment into private ownership of enterprise is particularly acute, however, when the state does not scrupulously follow clearly delineated and neutrally enforced legal rules in exercising its control rights over private enterprises.

98. HALEY & HALEY, supra note 8, at 2–3. A recent study found that the interest rate subsidies
received by China’s SOEs alone are greater than their profits. See Giovanni Ferri & Li-Gang Liu,
Honor Thy Creditors Beforan Thy Shareholders: Are the Profits of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises
Real?, 9 ASIAN ECON. PAPERS 50, 50 (2010).
99. See MATTHEW FORNEY & LAILA F. KHAWAJA, FATHOM CHINA LTD., PUBLIC FUNDS FOR PRIVATE FIRMS 3
(2013).
100. Id. at 10.
101. Michael Wines, China Fortifies State Businesses to Fuel Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/world/asia/30china.html.
102. See ROGERS & RUPPERSBERGER, supra note 36, at 15. The firm’s founder, Ren Zhengfei, retains
veto power under a shareholders’ agreement. See id. at 20.
103. For example, in 1998, the Beijing headquarters of China Construction Bank lent Huawei 3.9
billion RMB in buyer’s credit, representing forty-five percent of the total credit it extended that year.
NATHANIEL AHRENS, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, CHINA’S COMPETITIVENESS: MYTH, REALITY, AND
LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN—CASE STUDY: HUAWEI 6 (2013).
104. Id. at 11.
105. See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE
POSSIBILITIES 65–67 (2006).
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The Chinese state relies on several means to exercise extralegal control of
private firms. One such mechanism is so-called industrial associations, also
known in some sectors as chambers of commerce. Established in industries for
which supervising ministries have been disbanded, these ostensibly private
organizations are designed to coordinate activities within an industry.106 Yet the
industrial associations are staffed by former government officials from the
defunct ministries and have the same organizational structures and functions as
those ministries.107 The industrial associations actively supervise the operations
of firms in their respective industries and have retained much, if not all, of the
power exercised by their state predecessors.108 In the early 2000s, one such
industrial association, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of
Medicine and Health Products (Chamber), implemented an export regime for
the vitamin C industry under which the export prices of all vitamin C producers
were subject to review and approval by the Chamber.109 Some members of the
Chamber were sued in the United States for fixing the prices of vitamin C
products in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Defendants contended
that the Chamber is an entity through which the Chinese government exercises
its regulatory authority and that the price-fixing agreements at issue were
106. In the restructuring of the central government agencies in 1998, the ministries overseeing a
number of industries including coal, machinery, metallurgy, chemical, and textile were downgraded to
“national bureaus” under the State Economic and Trade Commission. See Jıngmàowěi Chèxia o Guójia
Guónèi Màoyì Jú Děng 9 Gè Guójia Jú [State Economic and Trade Commission Abolishes Nine
National Bureaus Including Domestic Distribution Bureau], XINHUÁ WǍNG [NEW CHINA NET] (Feb. 19,
2001, 17:33), http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/37340.html. In 2003, the national bureaus were abolished
and the administrative functions of those national bureaus were assumed by the SASAC. See ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD REVIEWS OF REGULATORY REFORM: CHINA—DEFINING THE BOUNDARY
BETWEEN THE MARKET AND THE STATE 94 (2009) [hereinafter OECD, BOUNDARY].
107. See Zheng, supra note 59, at 669–70. A number of industrial associations were established to
assume the regulatory functions of the national bureaus abolished in 2003. These industrial associations
include: China Iron and Steel Association, China Machinery Industry Federation, China Petroleum and
Chemical Industry Federation, China Light Industry Federation, China Textile Industry Association,
China Coal Industry Association, China Federation of Logistics and Purchasing, and China NonFerrous Metals Industry Association. In addition, a number of chambers of commerce were established
in the import and export sector. These chambers of commerce include: China Chamber of Commerce
for Import and Export of Textiles, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Light
Industrial Products and Arts-Crafts, China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals and Chemicals
Importers and Exporters, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Foodstuffs, Native
Produce and Animal By-Products, China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery
and Electronic Products, and China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Medicines and
Health Products. See LIÚ JIÀNHUÁ, ZHO NGGUÓ SHÌCHǍNG XIN ZHÌXÙ [CHINA’S NEW MARKET ORDER] 178 &
n.1 (2006).
108. On the official functions of such industrial associations, a U.S. court noted:
The [industrial associations] were given both governmental functions, which had previously
been performed by the [ministries], and private functions. The governmental functions
included, inter alia, responding to foreign anti-dumping charges and industry “coordination.”
The private functions of the [industrial associations] included organizing trade fairs, conducting market research and “mediating” trade disputes.
In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 810 F. Supp. 2d 522, 526 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
109. See id. at 528–29.
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compelled by the Chinese government.110 The Chinese Ministry of Commerce
took the unusual step of submitting an amicus brief in support of the defendants’ motion to dismiss.111 The federal district court in New York, however,
rejected this argument, holding that none of the laws and regulations cited by
the defendants and the Ministry of Commerce actually compelled the defendants to fix the prices of vitamin C products.112 In so doing, the court focused
solely on the formal language of the relevant legal rules and directives; it did
not consider the Chinese government’s ability and tendency to impose its
policies on private firms on an extralegal basis.
Another means by which the state exercises extralegal control over private
firms is the practice of regulators conducting “interviews” with private firm
managers to encourage or compel compliance with policies favored by the
government. As indicated above, the NDRC, China’s chief economic planning
agency, engages in this practice regularly.113 By law, the NDRC has the
authority to regulate the prices of only a small number of products and services
still subject to formal price control.114 Yet the NDRC routinely conducts
interviews with firms that are not subject to these controls to prod, and at times
order, adoption of NDRC-favored pricing policies. For example, in 2010,
China’s main cooking oil producers increased or were planning to increase
prices due to cost pressures. Concerned about the impact of these price hikes on
food-price inflation, the NDRC interviewed executives of the cooking oil
producers three times to urge them not to increase prices. During one of the
interviews, the NDRC straightforwardly ordered the producers to freeze prices
for four months, and the producers complied.115
Yet another means by which the state exercises extralegal control over private
firms is the practice of prodding or even forcing private firms to participate in
state-led industry-restructuring efforts. The right of ownership implies the right
to retain control or to be acquired by another firm, but in China, this right must
yield to the state’s plans for restructuring an industry. In 2009, for example,
Shandong Steel Group, a major SOE steel producer in the province, acquired
sixty-seven percent of the ownership of Shandong Rizhao Steel, an emerging
110. See id. at 525.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 551, 554, 555–56, 558 (rejecting agreed output restrictions, subcommittee membership, inability to export without price-setting, and the same treatment clause as sources of compulsion).
113. NDRC engages in this practice not only with private firms, but also with SOEs. For an example
involving SOEs, see supra section I.B.4.
114. In a government catalog published in 2001, the last year for which such catalogs are publicly
available, only thirteen categories of products or services were subject to price control by the
government, such as electricity, military products, and postal services. See GUÓJIÂ JÌWĚI HÉ GUÓWÙYUÀN
YǑUGUÂN BÙMÉN DÌNGJIÀ MÙLÙ [PRICING FIXING CATALOG OF THE STATE PLANNING COMMISSION AND THE
STATE COUNCIL] (2001), available at http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db⫽chl&Gid⫽36273.
115. See Shı́yòngyóu Qı̌yè Jìnnián Sâncì Bèi “Yuctán”—Xiàyóu Cânyı̌nyè Zhàn Bú Zhuı̂ Zhǎng
[Cooking Oil Companies “Interviewed” Three Times in Recent Years—Downstream Restaurants Temporarily Halting Price Hikes], XINHUÁ WǍNG [NEW CHINA NET] (July 30, 2012, 14:17:08), http://news.
xinhuanet.com/fortune/2012-07/30/c_123494170.htm.
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privately owned steel producer in the same province, under the auspices of an
industry restructuring plan drawn up by the Shandong provincial government a
year earlier.116 The acquisition was completed after the owner of Shandong
Rizhao Steel, Du Shuanghua, had repeatedly objected to the deal and had put up
fierce resistance by listing thirty-percent of Shandong Rizhao Steel’s assets in
Hong Kong through a reverse merger with a Hong Kong-listed company.117
The point of the foregoing discussion is not that the government has unbridled control over private firms, any more than it has free reign to impose its
will on SOEs. Rather, the point is that where a government routinely chooses to
enforce its policies by extralegal means, the added degree of autonomy from
government influence that ordinarily follows from private, as compared to
government, ownership of enterprise may be illusory. Of course, this is a
principal reason why politically connected entrepreneurs are so prevalent in
China: If private entrepreneurship does not bring added autonomy from the
state, better to seek the benefits of affiliation with the government.118 Simply
put, if you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em.
II. STATE CAPITALISM AND STATE CAPTURE
To this point, we have painted a rather paradoxical picture of the relationship
between the Chinese state and Chinese firms: The state has only attenuated
control over state-owned enterprises, yet it exerts significant control rights over
private firms in which it holds no ownership interests. The paradox, however, is
resolved when the focus of analysis shifts from the “state” versus “private”
nature of ownership rights in firms to the dynamics of capture in Chinese state
capitalism. For lack of a more widely accepted and analytically tractable term,
we use “capture” to describe the phenomenon in which firms obtain special
advantages from the national or local governments by aligning themselves with
the political leadership’s interests, goals, and priorities. The mechanisms or
means by which firms obtain these advantages range from corruption to ideology, and from the power of incumbency to the Party’s overriding political

116. See Shângâng Chóngzǔ Rìgâng Qiâodìng Zhàn Gǔ 67% [Shandong Steel Clinches Deal to
Acquire 67% of Rizhao Steel], XINLÀNG CÁIJING [SINA FIN. & BUS.] (Sept. 7, 2009, 04:56), http://finance.
sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20090907/04566714022.shtml.
117. Id. For more background on the acquisition, see SHENG HONG & ZHAO NONG, CHINA’S STATEOWNED ENTERPRISES: NATURE, PERFORMANCE AND REFORM 145–48 (2013). Interestingly, as shown in
Appendix I, Mr. Du was a politically connected entrepreneur, but all of his party-state affiliations were
in Hebei Province where he was born and predated his founding of Shandong Rizhao Steel in the
neighboring Shandong Province. See infra Appendix I, No. 36. Du’s apparent lack of party-state
affiliations in Shandong may have contributed to his firm becoming an acquisition target. See id.
118. This is corroborated by research indicating that the political participation of private entrepreneurs can be explained by the underdevelopment of markets and market-supporting institutions. See,
e.g., Hongbin Li et al., Why Do Entrepreneurs Enter Politics? Evidence from China, 44 ECON. INQUIRY
559 (2006) (showing that the probability of private entrepreneurs participating in political activities
decreases by 8%–20% from the mean when institutional indices improve by one standard deviation).
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imperative of sustained economic growth. Thus, as will become clear below,
capture in the Chinese context takes many different forms and has a variety of
different consequences.
A. SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CAPTURE

Every government creates and maintains rents by virtue of its regulatory
power.119 And in every economy where the government imposes restrictions on
economic activities, firms devote resources to capturing rents generated by
government restrictions.120 China is obviously not unique in the creation and
allocation of rents through government intervention in the economy.
Among the world’s major economies, however, the Chinese state is highly—
and perhaps uniquely—susceptible to capture for two reasons: the degree of
state intervention and porousness of its institutions. First, China’s huge economy
and massive state interventions therein increase the opportunities for and payoffs from capture. The Chinese economy, at $9 trillion as of 2013, is now the
second largest in the world.121 Yet the economy is, in the words of the Heritage
Foundation’s 2013 Index of Economic Freedom, “mostly unfree.”122 China
ranks near the bottom of the countries surveyed on measures of limited government, regulatory efficiency, and open markets.123 Despite liberalization efforts
in the past three decades that significantly reduced the formal share of the
state-owned sector in the economy, the Chinese state still plays a dominant role
in the economy, a role far greater than its equity ownership would suggest. In
addition to dispensing vast amounts of subsidies,124 the state intervenes in the
economy in significant ways, generating rents that are crucial for firms’ prosperity or even survival.
One primary example of state-generated rents is access to financing. The state
imposes a ceiling on bank deposit rates and channels credit at below-market
cost to firms favored by the state.125 As a result, firms in China invest in
political connections with the party-state to obtain low-cost financing. An

119. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964) (arguing that government largesse is replacing private property as a major source of wealth in the United States).
120. See Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV.
291, 291 (1974) (proposing a model in which firms compete for government-generated rents).
121. See GDP (Current US$), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD
(last visited Jan. 18, 2015).
122. TERRY MILLER ET AL., HERITAGE FOUND., 2013 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM 165 (2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
123. China ranks 136th, 147th, and 116th in the world by those measures, respectively. Id. at 166.
124. See supra section I.C.2.
125. See Tarhan Feyzioğlu et al., Interest Rate Liberalization in China 3 (Int’l Monetary Fund,
Working Paper No. 09/171, 2009). Prior to July 2013, China maintained both a ceiling on bank deposit
rates and a floor on bank lending rates. In July 2013, the floor on bank lending rates was eliminated.
This move, however, was largely symbolic because the vast majority of loans are made at or above the
benchmark rate. See Neil Gough, Liberalizing Interest Rates Remains a Challenge for China, N.Y.
TIMES (July 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/22/business/global/liberalizing-interest-ratesremains-a-challenge-for-china.html.
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abundance of empirical evidence indicates that the political connections of
firms in China are a strong indicator of their access to bank loans.126 Similarly, firms with political connections are also favored in stock listings.127
Smaller firms without political connections, by contrast, are forced to obtain
financing from China’s vast shadow banking system at high interest rates.128
Another example of state-generated rents is pervasive state-sanctioned monopolies. Many key industries in China, such as electricity, telecommunications,
petroleum, railroads, public utilities, and banking, are dominated by firms that
are de facto monopolies or oligopolies.129 These firms acquired their monopoly

126. See, e.g., Clement Kong Wing Chow et al., Investment Opportunity Set, Political Connection
and Business Policies of Private Enterprises in China, 38 REV. QUANTATIVE FIN. ACCT. 367, 367 (2012)
(finding that firms with political connections in China are able to borrow more); Hongbin Li et al.,
Political Connections, Financing and Firm Performance: Evidence from Chinese Private Firms, 87 J.
DEV. ECON. 283, 284 (2008) (finding that Communist Party membership helps private entrepreneurs in
China to obtain loans from banks or other state institutions); Wubiao Zhou, Bank Financing in China’s
Private Sector: The Payoffs of Political Capital, 37 WORLD DEV. 787, 788 (2008) (finding that
membership in China’s legislative or semilegislative organs helps private entrepreneurs obtain access to
bank loans); Robert Cull et al., Government Connections and Financial Constraints: Evidence from a
Large Representative Sample of Chinese Firms 7 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No.
6352, 2013) (finding that government connections are associated with substantially less severe financial
constraints at private firms in China).
127. More than half of the companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange are formerly stateowned companies. See Shen Hong, Weak Links Mar Investing in China, WALL ST. J. (June 26, 2013,
3:51 AM ET), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323998604578567722934644106.html.
A significant percentage of the listed firms have former or current government officials as their CEOs.
See Joseph P.H. Fan et al., Politically Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance, and Post-IPO
Performance of China’s Newly Partially Privatized Firms, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 330, 335 (2007) (finding
that almost 27% of the CEOs in a sample of 790 newly partially privatized firms in China are former or
current government bureaucrats or military officers). Among the listed firms, firms with politically
connected CEOs tend to underperform firms without politically connected CEOs, suggesting that firms
with politically connected CEOs may have been unduly favored in the state’s listing decisions. See id.
Politically connected firms also reap greater benefits in the process of going public. See Bill B. Francis
et al., Political Connections and the Process of Going Public: Evidence from China, 28 J. INT’L MONEY
& FIN. 696, 698 (2009) (finding that politically connected firms, irrespective of their ownership status,
have relatively higher offering prices, lower underpricing, and lower fixed costs during the going-public
process).
128. There is neither an official definition of shadow banking nor official statistics on the size of
shadow banking in China. If defined to include only underground lending, shadow banking is estimated
to total $1.3 trillion in China, according to Ren Xianfang, an economist with IHS Global Insights Ltd.
in Beijing. Shadow Banks on Trial as China’s Rich Sister Faces Death, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 11,
2012, 3:24 AM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-10/shadow-banks-on-trial-as-china-s-richsister-faces-death.html. If defined to also include the off-balance-sheet activities of banks, trust companies, and businesses lending to each other, China’s shadow banking system is estimated to total about
$2.4 trillion, a third the size of China’s official loan market, according to Societe Generale SA
economist, Yao Wei. Id. The customers of China’s shadow banking system are primarily small
businesses who are shunned by China’s state-owned banks. Id.
129. The power-generating industry in China is dominated by five SOE power-generating company
groups: China Huaneng Power Group, China Datang Corporation, China Huadian Corporation, China
Guodian Corporation, and China Power Investment Corporation. See Zheng, supra note 59, at 703 n.254.
The telecommunications industry in China is dominated by three SOE telecommunications carriers:
China Telecom, China Unicom, and China Mobile. See id. at 701 n.251. The petroleum industry is
dominated by three SOE petroleum company groups: China National Petroleum Corporation, Sinopec,
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or dominant status not through market competition, but through market-entry
restrictions imposed by the state.130 China adopted an Antimonopoly Law
(AML) in 2007, but the AML left intact the monopoly or dominant status of
firms in these industries.131
The second reason for the susceptibility of the Chinese state to capture is the
lack of procedural checks on the process by which rents are generated and
allocated. Although China has lawmaking institutions and procedures that outwardly resemble those typically found in a democracy,132 real lawmaking power
in China resides with the Communist Party.133 The party-state also enjoys broad
discretion in setting administrative rules.134 As the Heritage Foundation’s 2013
Index of Economic Freedom notes, “The legal and regulatory system is vulnerable to political influence and Communist Party directives. The party’s ultimate
authority throughout the economic system undermines the rule of law and
respect for contracts. Corruption is widespread, and cronyism is institutionalized and pervasive.”135 These weaknesses are partly a reflection of China’s
stage of development, but are also traceable to the Communist Party’s monopoly on political power. The monopoly reduces incentives to create neutral
market institutions that provide a level playing field for all entrepreneurs,
because the Party does not need to account for future states of the world in
which it is not in power.136 The result is an institutional ecology that encourages

and China National Offshore Oil Corporation. See BO KONG, CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM POLICY
15 (David L. Goldwyn & Jan H. Kalicki eds., 2010). The railroad industry is monopolized by one SOE,
China Railways Corporation. See Chinese State-Owned Railway Giant Goes into Business, PEOPLE’S
DAILY ONLINE (Mar. 17, 2013, 13:44), http://english.people.com.cn/90778/8171077.html. Public utilities
are dominated by two SOEs, State Grid Corporation of China and China Southern Power Grid
Company. See OECD, BOUNDARY, supra note 106, at 236. The banking industry in China is dominated
by four state-owned banks: the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the China Construction
Bank, the Agricultural Bank of China, and the Bank of China. See CHEN MENG, MULTINATIONAL BANKING
IN CHINA: THEORY AND PRACTICE 28 (2009).
130. Most of these market entry restrictions are effectuated through implicit licensing and minimum
capital requirements. See Zheng, supra note 59, at 660 n.72.
131. The AML provides that “the state protects the lawful business operations” of “the industries
controlled by the State-owned economy and concerning the lifeline of national economy and national
security or the industries implementing exclusive operation and sale according to law.” The Antimonopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 7, available at http://www.china.org.cn/government/
laws/2009-02/10/content_17254169.htm.
132. For an overview of China’s lawmaking institutions and procedures, see ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 79–88 (1992).
133. See Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 729–31 (1994).
134. See Peter Howard Corne, Creation and Application of Law in the PRC, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 369,
381 (2002).
135. MILLER ET AL., supra note 122, at 165. Moreover, China receives low rankings on the World
Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index with respect to variables such as limited government powers, open
government, and regulatory enforcement, even in regional rankings and within its income group. See
MARK DAVID AGRAST ET AL., WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2012–2013, 77 (2012–2013).
136. Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns . . .”: The Political Foundations of
Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 73 (2003) (arguing that an independent judiciary is
sustainable only when the political system is sufficiently competitive).
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all firms, whether SOE, POE, or of mixed ownership, to remain close to the
party-state as a source of protection and largesse.
B. MECHANISMS OF CAPTURE

The Chinese economy is distinctive not only in the scale of rents it generates,
but also in the mechanisms used to capture those rents. To illuminate the
mechanisms of capture in China, we adapt a simple model from Joel Hellman,
Geraint Jones, and Daniel Kaufmann, who studied the capture of state power in
transition economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.137 They
distinguish two types of powerful firms in an economy with insecure property
rights: “influential firms” are incumbents, typically SOEs, that inherited their
privileged position from the previous communist system; “[c]aptor
firms . . . are . . . de novo private firms” that “choose to engage in state capture
as a strategy to compete against these influential incumbents”—or, as they put it
more colorfully, “[c]aptor firms . . . purchase advantages directly from the
state.”138 Because Hellman et al. focused on Eastern Europe, the currency for
the purchases in their model consists solely of illicit, nontransparent payments.139 According to their analysis, the key distinguishing trait between these
two types of powerful firms is that captor firms pay bribes to shape the rules of
the game, whereas influential firms can do so simply through the power of
incumbency.140
Much of this model can be applied directly to China. Because property rights
are weak, in order to succeed firms must either inherit or earn privileges and
protections from the state—or more precisely, from the Party in its role as the
shadow monitor of state agencies and institutions. And as in their model, it is
useful to distinguish between influential firms (SOE incumbents) and captor
firms (large, successful POEs) in China. Chinese SOEs, like their counterparts
everywhere, have natural advantages in capturing state power and stategenerated rents. In the Chinese case, many SOEs were literally hived off of
government ministries that were eliminated in the transition to a marketoriented economy. Examples are abundant. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Sinopec, and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC),
China’s three state-owned petroleum firms, were created from the operating
assets of the former Ministry of Petroleum Industry.141 China’s five state-owned
137. See Joel S. Hellman, Geraint Jones & Daniel Kaufmann, Seize the State, Seize the Day: State
Capture and Influence in Transition Economies, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 751, 752–53 (2003).
138. Id. at 753.
139. See id. at 756.
140. See id. at 756–57.
141. See Kong, supra note 129, at 13. In 1982, the State Council created CNOOC under the Ministry
of Petroleum Industry (MPI) to be in charge of offshore oil exploration and production. In 1983, the
State Council grouped the refining and petrochemical assets from the MPI together with certain assets
from the Ministry of Chemical Industry and the Ministry of Textile Industry to create Sinopec. In 1988,
the government converted the MPI to CNPC, which inherited the remaining assets of the MPI and all
the administrative functions of the MPI. Id.
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power generating firms and two state-owned power grids were all part of the
State Power Corporation, which received the operating assets of the former
Ministry of Electricity.142 China’s three largest SOE telecommunications firms,
China Telecom, China Unicom, and China Mobile, were converted from the
operating assets of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications through many
rounds of industry restructuring.143 When the Ministry of Railways was eliminated in March 2013, its operating assets were taken over by the newly
established China Railway Corporation.144
In addition to their provenance traceable directly to the state, despite decades
of economic reforms, Chinese SOEs may also still benefit from orthodox
socialist ideology, enshrined in the constitution, which emphasizes state ownership of the means of production. Article 7 of the constitution, for example,
provides that the state-owned economy, that is, the socialist economy with
ownership by the whole people, is the leading force in the national economy.145
Within this constitutional framework, the private sector is a complement to the
socialist public economy.146
Despite these natural advantages of SOEs, it is possible for other firms in
China to purchase the right to compete with incumbent firms—that is, to play
the role of captor firms in the Hellman et al. model. Corruption of the sort that
figures prominently in that model certainly can buy influence in China, as seen
in the widespread phenomenon of private firms bribing party-state officials to
obtain government contracts and other favors from the state.147 Familial, personal, and professional connections also play important roles in capturing the

142. In 1997, the State Power Corporation took over the assets of the Ministry of Electricity. In
2002, the State Power Corporation was split into five power-generating company groups and two power
grids. See OECD, BOUNDARY, supra note 106, at 144.
143. Prior to 1994, China’s telecommunications industry was monopolized by China Telecom, an
arm of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. In 1994, the government formed two new
carriers, China Unicom and China Jitong, to compete with China Telecom. In 2000, the government
split China Telecom into four separate companies: China Mobile, China Netcom, China Satellite, and a
slimmed-down China Telecom. The telecommunication industry went through two other reshuffles in
2002 and 2008, resulting in the current industry structure where China Telecom, China Unicom, and
China Mobile divide the market for basic telecommunications services. See Zheng, supra note 59, at
701–02 n.251.
144. See Chinese State-Owned Railway Giant Goes into Business, supra note 129.
145. See XIANFA art. 7 (1982) (China). Ideology, however, may be a pretext for ulterior motives; it is
difficult to disentangle influence rooted in ideology from that based on the power of incumbency or
corruption.
146. Id. art. 11.
147. A recent example of corruption buying influence in China can be found in the case of the
former Minister of Railways, Mr. Liu Zhijun, who was investigated for channeling railway contracts to
a private businesswoman in return for kickbacks and sexual favors arranged by her. See Wang Chen et
al., How Dangerous Liaisons Led to Massive Corruption, CAIXIN ONLINE (Aug. 14, 2012, 18:51),
http://english.caixin.com/2012-08-14/100424022.html. Mr. Liu was convicted of corruption and abuse
of power and received a suspended death sentence. See China’s Former Railways Minister Liu Zhijun
Given Suspended Death Penalty for Bribery, Power Abuse, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (July 8, 2013,
16:09), http://english.people.com.cn/90785/8315997.html.
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state in China.148 In particular, firms connected to family members of senior
government officials can gain a significant advantage over other firms in
securing business deals with the state.149
But the mechanisms of capture in China differ from those of Eastern Europe
in that one key form of currency used by captor firms is not bribes, but growth
potential. This difference may be attributed to the vastly different paths of
economic reform followed in China as compared to Eastern Europe: gradualism
(in which the state has relaxed its grip on the economy episodically over a
period of decades) versus a big bang (in which state assets were released into
private hands almost overnight). Because the Chinese Communist Party is
averse to establishing accountability through the political process, its primary
claim to legitimacy in the reform era is the ability to deliver sustained economic
development and its hoped for counterpart, social stability.150 The overriding
primacy placed on sustained economic growth has enabled some private firms
to obtain special benefits from the state by demonstrating the potential to deliver
that growth. For example, Huawei, China’s leading telecommunications equipment company, achieved its initial success by developing a particular digital
telephone switch with greater capacity than any other products available on the
Chinese market at the time.151 After Huawei’s technological breakthrough,
government support flowed into the firm.152 Through its advanced technology
and ingenious marketing strategies, Huawei was able to overtake other influential firms in the Chinese market, including Shanghai Bell, a joint venture
between the business arm of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications and
the French corporation Alcatel,153 and Julong, which was assembled from eight

148. In an online application, Connected China, Reuters documents the complex webs of family,
personal, and professional relationships that form China’s elite power structure. See CONNECTED CHINA,
http://china.fathom.info (last visited Jan. 18, 2015).
149. As one example, it was reported in August 2013 that U.S. authorities opened a bribery
investigation into whether J.P. Morgan Chase hired the children of powerful Chinese officials to help
the bank win lucrative business in China. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg et al., Hiring in China by
JPMorgan Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2013, 8:01PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/
17/hiring-in-china-by-jpmorgan-under-scrutiny.
150. Scholars have hypothesized that the expectation of future income growth helps explain China’s
relatively high degree of social stability despite the enormous socioeconomic transition experienced
over the past three decades. See Paul Frijters et al., Are Optimistic Expectations Keeping the Chinese
Happy?, 81 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 159, 165 (2012).
151. See Huawei: The Company that Spooked the World, ECONOMIST, Aug. 4, 2012, http://www.
economist.com/node/21559929.
152. See AHRENS, supra note 103, at 5–6.
153. Shanghai Bell was established in 1983 as a joint venture between the China Post and
Telecommunications Industry Corporation, the business arm of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, and the ITT Corporation’s Belgian subsidiary, BTM. See Harwit, supra note 45, at 318. Alcatel
took control of BTM and became the new foreign partner for Shanghai Bell in 1987. Id. at 319.
Shanghai Bell’s market share was increasingly eclipsed by Huawei. By 1996, Huawei had twenty
percent of China’s switch market, second only to Shanghai Bell’s. Id. at 327. In 1998, Huawei pulled
even with Shanghai Bell, with a market share of about twenty-two percent. Id. By 2004, Huawei had
acquired a seventy-six percent share of the Chinese domestic market for telecommunications equipment. Id. at 330.
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SOEs supervised by key government ministries and the Chinese military.154
The political imperative for growth has been institutionalized in ways that
further distinguish the mechanisms of capture in China from those in other
transition economies. A unique attribute of state capitalism in China is the large
role played by local governments. Contrary to popular perception, China’s
model of economic decisionmaking is highly decentralized. This was true even
before the commencement of economic reform,155 but economic decentralization accelerated under transition policies such as “fiscal federalism”—a revenuesharing regime that grants a significant amount of autonomy to local governments
in setting local budgets and expenditures.156 In particular, a fundamental fiscal
reform in 1994 assigned local governments a lower revenue share but higher
expenditure responsibilities, leaving them no choice but to seek new tax bases.157
This reform, combined with the delegation of investment-approval authority to
local governments,158 led to competition among local governments for investment projects with high potential to generate tax revenues.159 Olivier Blanchard
and Andrei Shleifer theorized that this competition is made possible by a
politically centralized party-state that is ready to reward and punish local
officials based on their economic performance.160 This hypothesis finds support
in empirical evidence indicating that the likelihood of promotion of China’s

154. Julong was established in 1995 by grouping eight SOEs, four from the Post and Telecommunications Industry Corporation, three from the Ministry of Electronics Industry, and one from the Chinese
military. Id. at 322–23. Julong had the financial backing of the state, but over the years it lost out in
competition with Huawei and ZTE. See id. at 323–24.
155. Unlike the Soviet Union, China structured its industries in a much more decentralized fashion,
giving local governments considerable responsibility for coordinating production and distribution
within their jurisdictions. See Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, China’s Transition to Markets:
Market-Preserving Federalism, Chinese Style, 1 J. POL’Y REFORM 149 (1996) (explaining the historical
process of decentralization in China).
156. See Zheng, supra note 59, at 656–57.
157. See Justin Yifu Lin et al., Deregulation, Decentralization, and China’s Growth in Transition, in
LAW AND ECONOMICS WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: INSTITUTIONS FOR PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 467, 485 (David Kennedy & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2013).
158. The central government began to delegate a significant amount of investment approval authority to local governments starting in the 1960s. This trend continued into the reform era. By the early
2000s, a large majority of investments in urban areas were approved by local governments. See Zheng,
supra note 59, at 678–79.
159. See Lin et al., supra note 157, at 486 (“The pro-business tendency of Chinese local governments has become particularly obvious since the late 1990s, as local governments anxiously seek new
revenue sources by engaging in fierce competition for investment.”).
160. See Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, Federalism with and Without Political Centralization:
China Versus Russia 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7616, 2000). Note that
local government officials’ control over land use allows them a direct means of allocating property
rights to firms that place the highest value on such rights, presumably those with highest growth
potential. Often, the officials benefit personally in this process through side payments and the like. No
additional career incentives offered by the national government are required to make this system
function. Assignment of land-use rights is a capsule illustration of capture in both of the forms we use it
in this Article: corruption and convergence of interests. We are grateful to Tom Merrill for this point.
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provincial leaders increases with favorable economic performance.161 Scholars
have argued that competition among local governments is a main driver of
China’s economic growth in the reform era.162
This institutional setting suggests the diminishing relevance of enterprise
ownership to the party-state as the economy grows more complex. The growth
imperative forces the Party to look beyond SOEs in bolstering its claim to
legitimacy and enables private firms to capture state rents by demonstrating
growth potential, particularly to local government officials. As a recent report
notes, “Local leaders these days are assessed based on economic growth, and
are increasingly agnostic about what type of firm provides that growth.”163
The structural dynamics of capture are enhanced by two other factors that
provide special privileges to favored firms without particular regard to public or
private ownership. One such factor is industrial policy, which is used extensively to guide and promote economic development.164 Firms in preferred
sectors or industries, such as renewable energy, are in a privileged position
whether they are state-owned or privately owned.165 Another factor is nationalist sentiment, which favors Chinese firms, state-owned or private, over foreign
companies.166
As a result of these dynamics, successful large firms in China, irrespective of
ownership, are likely to be those that have captured state power and rents either
through incumbency or by demonstrating growth potential to government officials. Industrial policies, nationalist sentiment, and outright corruption reinforce
the advantages enjoyed by these firms. Firms that lack politically influential
attributes tend to be marginalized in China’s state-centered economy. Even

161. See Hongbin Li & Li-An Zhou, Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive
Role of Personnel Control in China, 89 J. PUB. ECON. 1743, 1744 (2005).
162. See, e.g., Jean C. Oi, Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism
in China, 45 WORLD POL. 99 (1992); Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, Federalism as a Commitment to
Preserving Market Incentives, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 83 (1997). The competition among local governments,
however, also leads to severe excess-capacity problems in many of China’s industries. See Zheng, supra
note 59, at 675–82; see also Jamil Anderlini, Chinese Industry: Ambitions in Excess, FIN. TIMES (June
16, 2013, 6:29 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4d5528ec-d412-11e2-8639-00144feab7de.html.
163. FORNEY & KHAWAJA, supra note 99, at 18.
164. The use of industrial policy in China was scattered and ineffective prior to the mid-2000s.
Since 2004, however, there has been a marked increase in the number of national industrial policy
programs. See Sebastian Heilmann & Lea Shih, The Rise of Industrial Policy in China, 1978–2012, at 3
fig. 1 (2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.harvard-yenching.org/features/hyiworking-paper-series-sebastian-heilmann-and-lea-shih.
165. China’s solar industry presents an example. China National Development Bank, one of China’s
policy-lending banks, provided $47 billion in preferential loans to Chinese solar companies in 2010.
See MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS
153 (2013). Shi Zhengrong, the founder of China’s leading solar panel manufacturer Suntech, received
$6 million from the City of Wuxi to have the company set up in Wuxi. Id. at 152. Suntech received a
preferential fifteen percent tax rate, millions in grants, and a $7 billion line of credit from China
National Development Bank. Id. at 153.
166. The rise of Huawei, for example, has benefited from nationalist sentiment and concomitant
national security concerns. See Harwit, supra note 45, at 325–28.
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SOEs that rely exclusively on incumbency, without the promise of growth, face
the prospect of being absorbed by stronger SOEs.167
C. STATE CAPTURE AND MARKET DOMINANCE

Patterns of market dominance in China are consistent with the claim that state
capture—as we have used the term—is a main determinant of success of
Chinese firms. These patterns simultaneously demonstrate how Chinese corporate development has been affected by path dependence and adaptation to the
institutional environment. When the state first withdrew from direct participation in commercial activity, SOEs were the default arrangement: They inherited
all of the operating assets from the supervising ministries and were the only
players in the market.168 The subsequent path of development would diverge,
however, depending on whether the SOE incumbents could secure stategenerated rents, particularly state-sanctioned monopoly status. When the SOE
incumbents fail to do so, they are exposed to the vagaries of market competition
and often lose out to emerging firms. The above-mentioned Shanghai Bell, an
incumbent telecommunications equipment firm that was marginalized by Huawei, provides an example.169 But if SOE incumbents could erect statesanctioned entry barriers against emerging firms, their incumbency status could
become entrenched, as seen in China’s monopoly industries.
The entrenching of incumbent firms due to state capture could lock China’s
industries in a pattern of path dependence. When incumbent firms have captured
the state, they become well positioned to resist additional reforms that would
threaten their incumbency status. This power of incumbency can be seen from
the state’s repeated failures to break up SOE monopolies in key industries. With
few exceptions, all such efforts have resulted in the breakup of SOEs along
either geographical or product lines, ensuring minimal competition among the
successor entities. In the petroleum industry, when the three giant state-owned
firms—CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC—were initially created in the 1980s, they
were assigned mutually exclusive business areas, with CNPC focusing on
onshore upstream production, Sinopec focusing on downstream refining, and
CNOOC focusing on offshore upstream production.170 Between 1998 and 2001,
the state restructured the petroleum industry and converted CNPC and Sinopec
into vertically integrated firms in preparation for China’s entry into the World
Trade Organization, but it did so by exchanging assets between CNPC and
Sinopec along geographical lines.171 As a result of the restructuring, CNPC and

167. For example, Shanghai Bell, which lost out in the competition with Huawei and ZTE, was
absorbed by Guoxin, the holding company established by SASAC to consolidate the central SOEs. See
supra note 87 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 141–144 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
170. See KONG, supra note 129, at 14.
171. See id. at 15.
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Sinopec were assigned separate business territories, with CNPC concentrating
in the north and Sinopec concentrating in the south.172
In the telecommunications industry, since 1994 the state has engaged in a
continuous process of breaking up SOEs along product or geographical lines,
reshuffling industry assets, and merging state enterprises.173 But all of the
activities still have not resulted in nationwide competition among firms across
all product lines.174 A similar pattern of breaking up a massive SOE into smaller
units along geographical lines exists in the power-generating industry175 as well
as in public utilities.176
The power of incumbency can also be seen in the marginalization of emerging firms that attempt to compete with incumbents but fail due to the lack of
state support. An example is the fate of China’s privately owned airlines.
Following the issuance of a government guidance document aimed at encouraging private firms to enter SOE-dominated sectors,177 six privately owned air-

172. See id.
173. In 1994, the state created a new telecommunications carrier, China Unicom, to compete with
China Telecom, the business arm of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. See Zheng, supra
note 59, at 668 n.111. In 2000, the state broke up China Telecom along product lines, with four
successor companies—China Telecom, China Mobile, China Netcom, and China Satellite—being
assigned business areas in landline, mobile, broadband internet, and satellite businesses, respectively.
See id. at 701–02 & n.251. In 2002, the already slimmed-down China Telecom was further broken
up—this time along geographical lines—into China Telecom Northern, which was merged into China
Netcom, and China Telecom Southern, which retained the name China Telecom. See id. In 2008, the
state reshuffled the telecommunications industry once again, creating three nationwide firms—China
Telecom, China Unicom, and China Mobile. See id.
174. In 2009, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) redivided the nationwide
landline market between China Telecom and China Unicom, again along geographical lines. The MIIT
assigned ten provinces in northern China and the province of Sichuan and the City of Chongqing in
southern China to China Unicom, and assigned twenty provinces in southern China and the City of
Beijing in northern China to China Telecom. See Go ngxìnbù Huàdìng Yùnyı́ngsha ng Jıngyı́ng Fànwéi:
Diànxìn Liánto ng “Ge jù” Nánběi [MIIT Divides Business Territories for Carriers: China Telecom and
China Unicom Assigned Southern and Northern China Respectively], XINHUÁ WǍNG [NEW CHINA NET]
(Mar. 18, 2009, 08:31:28), http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2009-03/18/content_11029184.htm.
175. When the State Power Corporation was broken up in 2002, its assets were allocated to five
successor companies that acquired a strong presence in their respective regional power markets. Among
the five successor companies,
Datang retained its strength in the north of China, near the coal supplies; Huaneng was strong
along the east coast; and Huadian was well represented in Shandong Province. . . . China
Power Investment was the only one of the five with significant nuclear capacity, and Guodian
was an important player in wind power.
OECD, BOUNDARY, supra note 6, at 236.
176. The power-transmission and distribution assets of the State Power Corporation were allocated
in 2002 to two successor power grids along geographical lines, with State Grid Corporation taking over
the majority of the regional grids in China and China Southern Power Grid Company taking over assets
in the far south of the country. See id.
177. See Guówùyuàn Guânyú Gǔlì Zhı̂chı́ Hé Yı̌ndǎo Gètı̌ Sı̂yı́ng Dı̀ng Fci Gôngyǒuzhì Jı̂ngjì
Fâzhǎn de Ruògân Yìjiàn [State Council’s Opinions on Encouraging, Supporting, and Guiding the
Economic Development of Individual, Private, and Other Nonpublic Sectors], ZHO NGHUÁ RÉNMÍN
GÒNGHÉGUÓ ZHÔNGYÂNG RÉNMÍN ZHÈNGFǓ [CENTRAL PEOPLE’S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
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lines came into operation after 2005.178 But the new airlines were unable to
compete with SOE incumbents, which had been allocated the most lucrative
routes.179 In the wake of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, SOE incumbent
airlines, but not the private carriers, received major government subsidies.180
Within a short period of time, most of the privately owned airlines were either
liquidated, acquired by SOE carriers, or in serious financial difficulty.181
This is not to say, however, that new firms cannot compete with entrenched
SOEs. Some large, successful private firms have emerged in industries with
strong SOE incumbents, but they did so principally in new markets—markets
not controlled from the outset by SOE incumbents. Where POEs demonstrate
growth potential and technological innovation in markets valued by the state,
their rise has not been blocked; indeed, it has been nurtured, particularly at the
local level. SOE incumbents, inured to the rents they have captured, generally
lack the acumen and incentives to anticipate or create new markets. Private
firms have developed to fill the void. Once POEs have become entrenched in a
new market with the backing of the state, it is difficult for SOEs to unseat them,
despite their natural advantages.
Examples of POEs dominating new markets in China are plentiful. Baidu,
China’s largest Internet search engine, spearheaded the Internet search market in
China when that market was still in its infancy.182 AliPay, a third-party online
payment platform owned by the e-commerce giant, Alibaba Group, became the
largest player in China’s emerging online payment market despite the dominance of state-owned banks in the traditional banking market.183 Private firm
ENN Group, China’s largest downstream natural gas supplier, achieved its
initial success by distributing natural gas to city residents through pipelines at a
time when most city residents in China either did not use natural gas at home or

CHINA] (Aug. 12, 2005), available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-08/12/content_21691.htm (promulgated by the St. Council, Feb. 19, 2005).
178. See Zheng, supra note 59, at 661 n.77.
179. Id. at 661 n.78. Chunqiu Airlines, one of the six private carriers, was forced to reassign
airplanes away from its Shanghai hub due to its inability to obtain more routes to and from the city. See
id.
180. See id. at 661 n.79.
181. See id. at 662.
182. For discussions of Baidu’s history and business models, see HUIYAO WANG, GLOBALIZING CHINA:
THE INFLUENCE, STRATEGIES AND SUCCESSES OF CHINESE RETURNEE ENTREPRENEURS 94–95 (2012). When
Baidu was first founded in 2000, the number of Internet users in China was estimated to be 16.9
million. See JOHN WONG & NAH SEOK LING, CHINA’S EMERGING NEW ECONOMY: THE INTERNET AND
E-COMMERCE 18 (2001). By the middle of 2012, that number was 538 million. See Jon Russell, Internet
Usage in China Surges 11%, USA TODAY (July 19, 2012, 9:15 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/
news/story/2012-07-19/china-internet-usage/56329450/1.
183. See LIU SHIYING & MARTHA AVERY, ALIBABA: THE INSIDE STORY BEHIND JACK MA AND THE
CREATION OF THE WORLD’S BIGGEST ONLINE MARKETPLACE 137–41(2009) (discussing AliPay’s history and
business models).
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had it distributed in tanks.184 ENN Group acquired its dominant market position
after it was able to secure franchise rights from over ninety cities across
China.185 By contrast, CNPC, China’s main upstream natural gas supplier, was
late in entering the downstream residential market; it had to use its monopoly on
upstream natural gas supply to pressure provinces and cities into granting it
franchise rights for downstream distribution.186
Large firm development in China, therefore, illustrates a large measure of
path dependence, with SOE incumbents dominating certain traditional industries and state-favored POEs controlling newer markets and industries. It also
demonstrates adaptation to the institutional environment. In a state-centered
ecosystem, successful private firms are the ones that have learned to ingratiate
themselves with the state. This suggests a survivorship bias at work in the
Chinese economy: State capitalism generates considerable institutional isomorphism between SOEs and POEs in regard to their business strategies and
relationship with the state. By contrast, firms that have failed to master the
capture economy or sought autonomy from the state are disproportionately
marginalized.
III. IMPLICATIONS
The foregoing analysis raises far-reaching implications for a host of theoretical, policy, and legal issues. Across all of these realms, the prevailing focal
point is the existence and extent of the state’s equity ownership in a firm. In this
dichotomous world, theorists and policy makers either check the SOE Box or
the POE Box, and a variety of implications follow from that fundamental
choice. If, as we have discussed, this exercise is largely unrevealing of the
Chinese state’s influence on and connections to a particular business enterprise,
then this entire construct needs to be rethought.
A. THEORY

The emergence of state capitalism in the global economy has exposed
limitations in the standard state-versus-private taxonomy of enterprise ownership.187 Not only have some SOEs proven to be formidable global competitors,
a far cry from the “grotesque failure” of state ownership in the era of central

184. See “Ránqì Dàwáng” Wèihé Xiǎng Tuìxiû [Why the “King of Natural Gas” Wants to Retire],
XINHUÁ WǍNG [NEW CHINA NET] (July 4, 2011, 09:08:02), http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2011-07/
04/c_121618110.htm.
185. Id.
186. See SHENG HONG & ZHAO NONG, supra note 117, at 152–54 (discussing CNPC’s efforts to
marginalize downstream natural gas suppliers through leveraging its control on upstream natural gas
supply).
187. See Shleifer, State Versus Private Ownership, supra note 5, for an example of analysis based on
a stark state-versus-private taxonomy. At the time most of this literature was produced, this simple
taxonomy was adequate to explain prevailing firm types.
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planning,188 but the theoretical underpinnings of the taxonomy seem increasingly impoverished in light of developments over the past decade. For example,
scholars have explored an undertheorized organizational alternative that is
prevalent in state capitalist economies: Enterprises with mixed state and private
ownership structures—that is, private investment in firms controlled by the
state.189 They hypothesize that mixed ownership, under circumstances such as
weak regulatory institutions, provides an attractive alternative to the typical
pattern in which private ownership of the firm is coupled with government
regulation of its activities.190 Examples of mixed ownership strategies in the
Chinese context are explored in section I.A of this Article and appear to support
the contention that these organizational forms are developed at least in part as a
response to gradual privatization programs carried out in a weak regulatory
environment, in which government backing remains a crucial element of a
firm’s success and protection.
Our analysis has highlighted a complementary organizational consequence of
state capitalism as practiced in China: Ownership of the firm as such provides
relatively little information about the degree of autonomy the firm enjoys from
the state. In the classic Grossman and Hart formulation, “Ownership is the
purchase of . . . residual rights of control.”191 But because the Chinese partystate retains (relatively undefined) residual control rights in firms of all types,
corporate “ownership” is less central to understanding the attributes of the
Chinese firm as compared to firms operating under market-neutral institutions
and relatively robust constraints on state intervention.
The diluted impact of ownership on the Chinese firm provides an illustration
of the by-now familiar point that institutions matter.192 But our analysis has
highlighted an underappreciated way in which the incentive effects generated
by the institutions of Chinese state capitalism matter: By blurring the distinction
between state and private enterprise. Scholars and policy analysts have widely
assumed that private firms by definition have more incentives to be innovative
than state-owned firms.193 And they have often used corruption as a sweeping
placeholder for the incentive effects operating on firms in low quality institutional environments.194 We have provided a much richer perspective, in which
the institutions of Chinese state capitalism cause all large successful firms,

188. Id. at 135.
189. See, e.g., Mariana Pargendler et al., In Strange Company: The Puzzle of Private Investment in
State-Controlled Firms, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 569 (2013).
190. See id. at 578–91.
191. Grossman & Hart, supra note 2, at 692.
192. According to Douglass North, institutions play an instrumental role in economic development.
See Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359, 366 (1994) (“It
is the admixture of formal rules, informal norms, and enforcement characteristics that shapes economic
performance.”).
193. See, e.g., Shleifer, State Versus Private, supra note 5, at 135 (“[P]rivate ownership is the crucial
source of incentives to innovate and become efficient . . . .”).
194. See id. at 143–44.
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irrespective of ownership, to share similar incentives and to be positioned
nearly identically in relation to the state. Underdeveloped legal and political
institutions do lead to corruption as one mechanism of capture, but in China,
growth potential, due to its close association with political legitimacy, is the key
currency with which to obtain state backing irrespective of ownership.
This insight reinforces conclusions about China’s unorthodox developmental
path that one of us has reached in separate co-authored works.195 The alliances
formed by the party-state with firms offering growth potential, regardless of
ownership, and the role of the party-state in funding, incentivizing, and monitoring the managers of such firms, is reminiscent of a private equity partnership.196
Moreover, the integration of a large swath of the entrepreneurial population into
the formal structures of party-state governance, which is documented in our
Appendices, calls to mind Mancur Olson’s concept of an “encompassing coalition”—a group representing a large enough segment of the population that it has
incentives to grow the pie.197 By creating dense networks of managerial elites
permeating both politics and business in China, an encompassing coalition has
been created with control over developmental policy formation and
implementation.198
B. POLICY

Rent seeking, like productive innovation, is ultimately a product of institutions. Thus, as we elaborate below, reform-minded analysts and policy makers
would do well to focus less on privatization of SOEs and shrinking the size of
the state sector—a common prescription—than on changing the incentives
generated by the institutions of Chinese state capitalism.
1. China’s Domestic Economy
As China’s investment-driven economy matures, economic growth and competitiveness will increasingly depend on the ability of Chinese firms to move up
the value chain. Innovation and productivity will be central to this effort, and
thus the future dynamism of the Chinese economy will depend in large measure
on the country’s capacity to foster entrepreneurship and to nurture enterprises
that direct more efforts toward generating consumer surplus than to cozying up
to the state. Chicago school economist, Gary Becker, sums up the situation thus:
China’s new leaders have now made clear that the country needs to rely much
more on the creativity and resourcefulness of the private sector if it is to move
beyond middle income status, and become a major economic power as

195. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Economically Benevolent Dictators: Lessons
for Developing Democracies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 227 (2011); Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 8.
196. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 195, at 262.
197. See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND
SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 48 (1982).
198. Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 8, at 708.

2015]

STATE CAPITALISM AND THE CHINESE FIRM

703

measured . . . by per capita GDP. It remains to be seen whether even the new
leaders can overcome the strong opposition of SOEs and other special interest
groups to the implementation of a major shift toward the private sector.199

As Becker suggests, SOEs are typically seen as the major obstacle to a move
toward a private-sector driven economy. Ironically, our analysis suggests that, in
China’s current institutional environment, the “private sector” poses equally
formidable obstacles to this transformation. Chinese state capitalist institutions
do encourage private entrepreneurs to innovate and to explore new markets, and
private firm innovation has undoubtedly contributed significantly to China’s
economic growth. But once innovative entrepreneurs become acclimated to
state largesse and protection, it is to be expected that many will shift focus to
maintaining the privileges of incumbency.200 Even if innovative private firms
increasingly chafe at the strings that come with state support and affiliation, it is
unlikely that they can become an independent force for institutional reform in
the current political climate.
Does ownership matter when considering obstacles to China’s institutional
development? In other words, does it matter whether SOEs or POEs have
captured state power and largesse? Any influential firm—whether SOE, POE, or
a mixed-ownership enterprise—will resist reforms that threaten its privileged
position in the economy. From this perspective, that not only SOEs but also
large swaths of the private sector have vested interests in the status quo bodes ill
for the development of a truly entrepreneurial economy in China. It is plausible
that potential improvement in the quality of China’s institutions is less threatened, or even favored, by firms that are free of government ownership. As
compared to SOEs, POEs have a smaller stake in defending the political and
ideological predilection for pervasive state intervention in the economy.201 But
as noted above, even assuming the motivation to do so, private firms abandoning state support have little prospect of constituting a reform-oriented interest
group.
Closely related to this question is the so-called guo jin min tui (the state
advances, the private sector retreats) debate. Critics assert that the Chinese
government has failed to deliver on its commitment to the creation of a market
economy, made in connection with China’s accession to the WTO in 2001.202
By some measures and in the perception of many, over the past decade the

199. Gary Becker, China’s Tilt Toward the Private Sector?, BECKER–POSNER BLOG (May 26, 2013,
4:48 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2013/05/chinas-tilt-toward-the-private-sector-becker.
html.
200. For example, research indicates that once a POE receives a government subsidy, it tends to
continue receiving subsidies in subsequent years. See FORNEY & KHAWAJA, supra note 99, at 3.
201. As the European Commission has observed of Chinese firms, “[T]he possibilities for SOEs to
act completely independently might be more limited than for private enterprises . . . .” Commission
Decision No. COMP/M.6113 (DSM/Sinochem/JV) ¶ 24 (May 19, 2011).
202. See, e.g., Ten Years in the WTO: Has China Kept Its Promises?: Hearing Before the Cong.Exec. Comm’n on China, 112th Cong. 27–28 (2011) (statement of Alan H. Price, Partner and Chair,
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state’s role in the economy has actually expanded, to the detriment of marketoriented institutions and private enterprise.203 Defenders of current policy assert
that the guo jin min tui concept is based on a one-sided perspective of the
ownership of enterprise and a “false proposition” because the state and private
sectors are complementary.204
Our analysis presents a more nuanced perspective on the guo jin min tui
phenomenon than the views above. Conceptually, it is true that the guo jin min
tui critique may have overemphasized the ownership of enterprise—precisely
the tendency we have argued is to be avoided in analyzing Chinese firms. But
our analysis does not support the view that the state and private sectors in
China, as currently constituted, are complementary. They are potentially complementary only if the state sector is equated simply with the state-owned sector, as
is common among analysts.205 But our analysis suggests that the size of the
state-owned sector is not an accurate measure of the impact of state capitalism
on the Chinese domestic economy. Considering the incentive effects of the
institutional environment, the state and private sectors are anything but complementary; rather, a state-centered ecology creates a vacuum siphoning oxygen
out of the private sector, generating large “private” firms that are avatars of
state-owned enterprises.
Thus, a shift toward the creation of a true private sector in China will require
more than the commonly proffered prescriptions of privatizing SOEs and
shrinking the state’s share of the economy. It will require the formation of
robust market-neutral institutions: a corporate law that permits entrepreneurs to
contract away from state-favored organizational forms, a robust and neutrally
enforced antimonopoly law, and elimination of preferential access to bank
finance and the capital markets for state-favored firms, to name a few key
reforms. As the World Bank’s influential report, China 2030, argues, “As an
economy approaches the technology frontier and exhausts the potential for
acquiring and applying technology from abroad, the role of the government and
its relationship to markets and the private sector needs to change fundamentally.”206 Our analysis indicates that the state sector must be curtailed, not
principally through changes in ownership, but through massive institutional
reforms that foster the growth of firms without deep ties to the party-state.

International Trade Practice, Wiley Rein, LLP) (criticizing China’s continued state ownership and
control over key segments of its economy as contrary to its WTO commitments).
203. See, e.g., SHENG HONG & ZHAO NONG, supra note 117, at 154–56 (discussing the dangers of the
advancement of state-owned enterprises in China).
204. Economist Defends Relationship Between SOEs, Private Firms, CHINA DAILY (May 12, 2012,
16:29), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-05/12/content_15277374.htm (quoting economist
Hu Angang as arguing that the widening development gap between the state-owned sector and the
private sector is a “false proposition”).
205. See, e.g., China’s State Capitalism: Not Just Tilting at Windmills, ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21564235.
206. WORLD BANK & DEV. RESEARCH CTR. OF THE STATE COUNCIL, THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
CHINA 2030: BUILDING A MODERN, HARMONIOUS, AND CREATIVE SOCIETY xxi (2013).
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But here the dynamics of capture again rear their ugly head. China’s incremental economic reforms in the past three decades have led to the entrenchment of
interest groups—perhaps an inevitable consequence of any gradualist transition
model.207 Even if the top political leadership is serious about altering the state’s
relationship to the economy, a large class of powerful interests—again, comprised not only of SOE incumbents but of private entrepreneurs deeply connected to the party-state as well—is positioned to undermine the impact of
market-neutral policies.208 Worse yet, if gradualism leads to the public perception that market reforms benefit only the well connected, the state may be
prompted to backtrack on reforms in response to popular discontent.209 Increased state intervention could prompt more rent seeking, resulting in a
“political ‘vicious circle.’”210 In light of these complexities, our analysis casts
doubt on how far China can go in reducing the role of the state in its economy
without significant political reforms.211
2. Host Countries Receiving Chinese Investment
Barring a major shift toward a truly private-sector driven economy in China,
regulators and policy makers around the world will likely face more conundrums of the sort posed by Huawei and ZTE—commercially oriented, globally
active firms that nonetheless have deep connections to the Chinese party-state.

207. For analysis of the perils of the gradualist transition model, see generally SERGUEY BRAGUINSKY
& GRIGORY YAVLINSKY, INCENTIVES AND INSTITUTIONS: THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY IN RUSSIA
(2000); MINXIN PEI, CHINA’S TRAPPED TRANSITION: THE LIMITS OF DEVELOPMENTAL AUTOCRACY (2006); Joel
S. Hellman, Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions, 50 WORLD
POL. 203, 232–33 (1998).
208. The government’s failure to open up China’s monopoly industries to private investment
illustrates the power of special interests. See supra section II.C. Following the issuance of a 2005
guidance document aimed at encouraging private investment in China’s monopoly industries, in 2010,
the State Council made renewed efforts to relax market entry restrictions against private firms by
issuing another guidance document. See Guówùyuàn Guânyú Gǔlì Hé Yı̌ndǎo Mı́njia n Tóuzı Jiànka ng
Fâzhǎn de Ruògân Yìjiàn [State Council’s Opinions on Encouraging and Guiding the Healthy Development of Private Investments], ZHO NGHUÁ RÉNMÍN GÒNGHÉGUÓ ZHÔNGYÂNG RÉNMÍN ZHÈNGFǓ [CENTRAL
PEOPLE’S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (May 13, 2010), available at http://www.gov.
cn/zwgk/2010-05/13/content_1605218.htm (promulgated by the St. Council, May 7, 2010). The new
efforts, however, have not yielded concrete progress to date. See “Xın 36 Tiáo” Xuán ér Wèi Luò
[“New Thirty-Six Articles” Issued But Not Implemented], CÁIJING ZÁZHÌ [CAIJING MAG.] (May 22, 2011,
22:17), http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/2011-05-22/110726162.html.
209. There are signs that this is already taking place, as a “new left” movement in China is
increasingly criticizing the party’s current policies for widening inequality and breeding social unrest.
See Brian Spegele, China’s “New Left” Grows Louder, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2012, 7:08 PM ET),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443493304578038121620762516.html.
210. Krueger, supra note 120, at 302.
211. China’s former premier repeatedly called for political reforms—an indication that the Chinese
leadership recognizes that further economic reforms require new political institutions. See Malcolm
Moore, Wen Jiabao Promises Political Reform for China, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 4, 2010, 5:35 AM BST),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8040534/Wen-Jiabao-promises-political-reformfor-China.html; Michael Wines, Wen Calls for Political Reform but Sidesteps Details, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/world/asia/china-wen-jiabao-calls-for-political-reform.
html.
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As China’s “go global” policy accelerates, other Chinese firms will have to
convince skeptical foreign governments that their motives and strategic orientation are purely commercial and not aimed at siphoning technologies or controlling natural resources for the benefit of the Chinese state. This is a collateral
cost of state capitalism, borne by all globally active Chinese firms, whether
SOE, POE, or a mixed-ownership blend. The House Select Committee investigation of Huawei and ZTE underscores this collateral cost. The committee’s
findings on the links between these firms and the Chinese government were far
from conclusive, but in the absence of more information, doubts were resolved
in favor of the Committee’s suspicions that “Huawei and ZTE cannot be trusted
to be free of foreign state influence and thus pose a security threat to the United
States and to our [telecommunications] systems.”212
The controversy over a Chinese acquisition of a U.S. meat producer suggests
that state capitalism imposes costs on globally active Chinese firms even where
sensitive technology or critical infrastructure is not involved. In May 2013,
Shuanghui, a privately owned Chinese meat processor, announced a deal to
acquire Smithfield, the largest pork producer in the United States.213 The taint
of suspicion over Shuanghui’s motives clouded announcement of the deal and
led to a Senate hearing on the transaction.214 Shuanghui, like many private firms
in China, emerged out of state ownership, having been publicly listed in
2006.215 As with Huawei and ZTE, controversy focused on whether Shuanghui
was still effectively under the control of the Chinese government and the
Communist Party, such that the acquisition was a Trojan horse bringing any
number of potential problems to the United States, such as technology theft,
predatory pricing, and contamination of the food supply.216 The U.S.–China
Economic and Security Review Commission noted that Wan Long, Shuanghui’s
chairman and major shareholder of the entity used for the management buyout
in the privatization process, is a member of the Communist Party and a delegate

212. ROGERS & RUPPERSBERGER, supra note 36, at vi–vii.
213. Michael J. de la Merced, A Mystery of Smithfield’s Big China Deal: What Continental Grain
Will Do, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2013, 4:30 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/30/a-mystery-ofsmithfields-big-china-deal-what-continental-grain-will-do.
214. Michael J. de la Merced, Senate Agriculture Committee Calls Hearing on Smithfield Deal, N.Y.
TIMES (June 27, 2013, 12:12 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/senate-agriculture-committeecalls-hearing-on-smithfield-deal.
215. Currently, Shuanghui’s management owns 36% of the equity, but those shares have greater
voting rights than other shares. Its other major shareholders are CDH, a Chinese private equity firm
(34%), Goldman Sachs (5%), New Horizon, a Chinese private equity firm founded by the son of
China’s former premier (5%), and Temasek, the Singapore sovereign wealth fund (3%). Chao Deng,
Smithfield Buy Could Help Shuanghui Owners Exit, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2013, 5:46 AM ET),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/06/03/smithfield-buy-could-hel-shuanghui-owners-exit.
216. Consider this comment: The Shuanghui bid “is so wrapped up in previous and current
government control or strategy that it cannot be considered a free market transaction. Goldman Sachs
should not be allowed to launder China’s SOEs for global foreign investment purposes.” Michael
Stumo, Mapping China’s Foreign Investment—and the Smithfield Deal, TRADE REFORM (June 4, 2013),
http://www.tradereform.org/2013/06/mapping-chinas-foreign-investment-and-the-smithfield-deal.
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to the National People’s Congress.217 Commenting skeptically on the proposed
transaction, the Commission concluded, “A final concern is that Shuanghui is an
instrument for the Chinese government’s industrial policy.”218
Suspicions about foreign investments by Chinese firms, regardless of ownership, are likely to remain as long as the state retains equity interests in
ostensibly private enterprises; the government routinely provides subsidies and
privileged market access to state-linked firms; and it is common practice for
senior executives at major firms, SOE or POE, to be affiliated with the partystate in various capacities. In short, suspicions about foreign investments by
Chinese firms will linger as long as the institutional foundations of Chinese
state capitalism remain intact.
3. International Trade and Investment Regimes
The global trade and investment regimes rely heavily on ownership-based
distinctions among firms. To list just a few examples, the Model Bilateral
Investment Treaty of the United States, published in April 2012, attempts to
discipline the preferential treatment of SOEs.219 SOEs have cropped up as an
important issue in the negotiation of free trade agreements (FTAs) as the United
States and the European Union seek to create special rules to regulate the
market distorting activities of state-owned firms that are not adequately addressed by existing trade and investment regimes. And the OECD’s “competitive neutrality” project pivots on ownership.220 The project’s premise is that
[g]overnments may create an uneven-playing field in markets where stateowned enterprises (SOE) compete with private firms, as they have a vested
(direct or indirect) interest in ensuring that state-owned firms succeed. . . .
. . . In the current context the ownership issue is limited to the state and
is applied to the activities of all types of government-owned bodies that are
actually or potentially competing with private operators in any market . . . .221

217. See U.S.–CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, MONTHLY SUMMARY OF U.S.–CHINA TRADE DATA
7 (2013), available at http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/trade_bulletins/June%202013%20
Trade%20Bulletin_6%207%2013.pdf.
218. Id.
219. See 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
(Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf.
220. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMPETITIVE NEUTRALITY: A COMPENDIUM OF OECD
RECOMMENDATIONS, GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES 13 (2012).
221. Id. Note, however, that some OECD research on the subject has taken a holistic view of these
challenges. An OECD policy paper, while focused on SOEs, makes clear that the problem of “national
champions” receiving preferential treatment by home governments is not limited to SOEs, but can
extend to private firms. Antonio Capobianco & Hans Christiansen, Competitive Neutrality and StateOwned Enterprises: Challenges and Policy Options 30 (OECD Corporate Governance, Working Paper
No. 1, 2011), available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5kg9xfgjdhg6.pdf?expires⫽
1421632592&id⫽id&accname⫽guest&checksum⫽404DF23FAB29AF738F37C3F32F07D42F.
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Similarly, analysis of China’s foreign direct investment is often based on
simple ownership taxonomies. A recent, widely cited report highlighted a major
increase in investment in the United States by private Chinese firms.222 However, “private” firms were defined in the report as those with less than twenty
percent government ownership.223
If, as we have argued, the dichotomy between SOE and POE is a false one in
the Chinese institutional context, then ownership-based analyses of and policy
responses to the rise of Chinese firms in the global economy are likely to be
imprecise and possibly misdirected. Our discussion suggests that the SOE–POE
dichotomy is simply unworkable in the Chinese context and should be abandoned. Unfortunately, there is no easy substitute for this shorthand analytic
device. But the first step in understanding the ecology of corporate capitalism in
China is moving away from ownership-based distinctions and focusing on the
impact of party-state influence on firm incentives, and on firm-state connections
beyond the realm of equity ownership. As we explore below, this step is crucial
for reform of several legal regimes relevant to Chinese firms in the global
economy.
C. LAW

The rise of Chinese state capitalism poses challenges not only for policy
makers, but also for courts, administrative agencies, and dispute settlement
tribunals around the world. These institutions must grapple with complex issues
raised by Chinese firms—newly active global players rising out of a domestic
system that does not operate according to prevailing assumptions about the
market–state boundary or settled notions about ownership and security of
property rights. Yet confronted with these issues, many regulatory and legal
regimes tend to use the blunt gauge of enterprise ownership to demarcate the
boundary of the Chinese state. We previously noted a U.S. federal court’s
difficulty in accepting a government compulsion argument in an antitrust case
based on informal Chinese norms and extralegal government control of private
firms.224 Ownership-based analyses are now a standard feature in multiple areas
of economic regulation, including the antitrust, anticorruption, and antisubsidy
regimes. Without attempting a comprehensive analysis of these regimes, we
briefly discuss below the ownership bias in these areas of law and the resulting
222. See Thilo Hanemann, Chinese FDI in the United States: Q1 2013 Update, RHODIUM GROUP
(Apr. 30, 2013), http://rhg.com/notes/chinese-fdi-in-the-united-states-q1-2013-update (“In the past 15
months private Chinese firms spent more on US deals than in the 11 years before combined. In the same
period they accounted for 80% of transactions and 50% of total transaction value, a dramatic change
compared to previous years when state-owned firms dominated Chinese capital flows to the US.”) A
representative media account of this report is David Welch et al., Smithfield Stoking U.S. Unease Belies
Benefit of China Deals, BLOOMBERG (June 7, 2013, 4:12 PM ET), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201
3-06-06/smithfield-stoking-u-s-unease-belies-benefit-of-chinese-deals.html (noting that “[p]rivate companies are also freer of government influence”).
223. Hanemann, supra note 222.
224. See supra notes 112 and accompanying text.
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difficulty of addressing issues raised by Chinese firms under existing legal
frameworks.
1. Antitrust
Antitrust law is the leading edge in the developed West’s encounter with
Chinese state capitalism. In addition to muddling analysis in the state compulsion doctrine as noted above, the nebulous market–state boundary in China
poses challenges for merger analysis and potentially for analysis of horizontal
agreements as well.
In merger review, the conventional framework, which takes the individual
firms that are parties to the merger as the unit of analysis, has proven inadequate
when a Chinese SOE is a party to the merger. In theory, the Chinese state owns
all SOEs. The question for antitrust regulators is thus whether the entire SOE
sector should be considered a single economic entity, such that the relevant unit
of analysis is all SOEs in the sector in question.
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) grappled
with this question in its evaluation of a proposed alliance between Rio Tinto and
state-owned China Aluminum Corporation, or Chinalco.225 When evaluating the
competitive impact of the proposed transaction, the ACCC considered whether
the proposed transaction would likely affect iron ore prices by providing
Chinalco with the incentive and ability to reduce iron ore prices below competitive levels to benefit Chinese steel mills. The ACCC pointed out that Chinalco
might have such an incentive if Chinalco, the Chinese government, and Chinese
steel mills operate as a “single entity.”226 The ACCC determined that if they do
constitute a single entity, it might be worthwhile for Chinalco to pursue such a
strategy because the loss to Chinalco as a shareholder of Rio Tinto would likely
be offset by gains to the Chinese steel mills.227 However, the agency estimated
that Rio Tinto would not have the ability to unilaterally influence global iron ore
prices to a significant extent.228 Therefore, it concluded that it was not necessary
to conduct the single-entity analysis.229
This “recognize-but-dodge” approach has also been adopted by the European
Commission. Recital 22 of the Preamble to the European Merger Regulation
provides that in the evaluation of mergers involving SOEs, account has to be
taken of the “undertakings making up an economic unit with an independent
power of decision, irrespective of the way in which their capital is held or of the
rules of administrative supervision applicable to them.”230 As a result, the

225. See AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N, PUBLIC COMPETITION ASSESSMENT: CHINALCO
(ALUMINUM CORPORATION OF CHINA) (2009), http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/866064/
fromItemId/751043.
226. Id. ¶ 37.
227. See id. ¶ 40.
228. See id. ¶ 41.
229. See id. ¶ 42.
230. Council Regulation 139/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 24) ¶ 22 (EC).
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European Commission looks beyond the nominal shareholding and governance
structures of SOEs, and focuses instead on whether SOEs have an “independent
power of decision.”231 In several merger cases involving Chinese SOEs,232
however, the European Commission dodged this inquiry. In one recent case, for
example, China National Bluestar, a Chinese SOE, proposed to acquire Elkem,
a Norwegian silicon producer. China National Bluestar is a subsidiary of China
National Chemical Corporation (ChemChina), a central SOE overseen by
SASAC.233 The parties to the acquisition submitted evidence that ChemChina
has independent power of decision from the Chinese state, at both the central
and local government levels.234 After a lengthy examination of the competitive
position of Elkem versus China National Bluestar, ChemChina, and other
Chinese SOEs, the European Commission concluded that “the proposed transaction would not lead to any competition concerns even if ChemChina and other
SOEs operating in any of the markets concerned, under the Central and Regional SASACs, were to be regarded as one economic entity.”235 According to
the European Commission, therefore, “it is not necessary to conclude definitively on the ultimate control of ChemChina.”236
Although the ACCC and the European Commission disposed of these cases
in a manner that obviated the need for factual inquiries into the control of
Chinese SOEs, they did recognize, as a matter of principle, that state ownership
is not synonymous with state control. This approach avoids the ownership bias
of treating SOEs as the alter ego of the state by virtue of equity ownership
alone. But these regulators exhibit a quintessential ownership bias in the sense
that only SOEs are subject to heightened scrutiny.237 For instance, in its review
of Geely’s acquisition of Volvo in 2010, the European Commission approved

231. Id.
232. See Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6141 (China National Agrochemical Corp./Koor
Indus./Makhteshim Agan Indus.) (Oct. 3, 2011); Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6113 (DSM/
Sinochem/JV) (May 19, 2011); Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6151 (Petrochina/Ineos/JV) (May
13, 2011); Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6082 (China National Bluestar/Elkem) (Mar. 31, 2011).
For detailed discussions of the European Commission’s analysis in these cases, see Angela Huyue
Zhang, The Single-Entity Theory: An Antitrust Time Bomb for Chinese State-Owned Enterprises?, 8
J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 805, 821–24 (2012).
233. See Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6082 (China National Bluestar/Elkem) ¶¶ 2–4 (Mar.
31, 2011).
234. See id. ¶¶ 18–32. The evidence submitted by the Chinese parties concerned whether SASAC
interferes with the strategic decision making of ChemChina, whether SASAC has requested commercial information from ChemChina or otherwise influenced the commercial operations of the company,
and whether central SASAC has operational control over local SASACs or firms supervised by local
SASACs. See id.
235. Id. ¶ 34.
236. Id.
237. In one EU merger review case, the European Commission stated in a footnote that it analyzed
whether the Chinese state could influence the behavior of private Chinese firms active in the industry
and determined that it could not. See Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6113 (DSM/Sinochem/JV)
6 n.15 (May 19, 2011). The European Commission, however, did not elaborate on the basis of that
determination. See id.
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the transaction on the grounds that there were very limited horizontal overlaps
between the activities of Geely and Volvo.238 The European Commission did
not examine whether the Chinese state could influence the activities of Geely,
presumably because Geely is privately owned.239 If the Chinese state could
influence the activities of Geely, it would become necessary for the European
Commission to examine not only whether there were overlaps between the
activities of Volvo and Geely, but also whether there were overlaps between the
activities of Volvo and other Chinese firms subject to state influence. The lack
of inquiry into the relationships between POEs and the Chinese state is all the
more striking in this case given that much of the financing for Geely’s acquisition was provided by local governments in China.240
If, as our analysis suggests, the institutions of Chinese state capitalism
incentivize POEs to behave like SOEs in areas of concern to antitrust regulators,
the theoretical premise for applying the “independent power of decision” scrutiny to Chinese SOEs alone may be called into question. Granted, this brightline rule applying the single-entity test only to SOEs may have been motivated
by considerations of administrative efficiency. But given the substantial similarities between SOEs and POEs in China in terms of government influence, an
alternative rule would be to submit no Chinese firms, whether SOEs or POEs, to
the single-entity test unless there is particular evidence indicating a level of
government influence beyond what is normally expected in commercial settings. This alternative rule arguably achieves an equivalent level of administrative efficiency but is better suited to the realities of China’s institutional
environment.
The ownership bias is even more evident in the antitrust analysis of horizontal agreements. Under the so-called single-entity defense, units of a single
economic entity cannot conspire to restrain trade within the meaning of the
antitrust laws.241 In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., the U.S.
Supreme Court held that “an internal ‘agreement’ to implement a single, unitary
firm’s policies does not raise the antitrust dangers that §1 [of the Sherman Act]
was designed to police.”242 Whether the horizontal agreement in question is an
internal agreement among units of a single entity turns on control, proxied
primarily by ownership. According to the Supreme Court in Copperweld, a
parent firm and its wholly owned subsidiary are a single entity because they
have a “unity of purpose or a common design,” and “the parent may assert full

238. See Press Release, European Commission, Mergers: Commission Approves Proposed Acquisition of Volvo Cars by Geely and Daqing (July 6, 2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
IP-10-904_en.htm.
239. See id. Geely appears as number six in a ranking of China’s top 100 POEs. See infra
Appendix I.
240. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
241. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.” Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
242. 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984).
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control at any moment if the subsidiary fails to act in the parent’s best
interests.”243 After Copperweld, the single-entity defense has frequently barred
antitrust claims involving horizontal agreements among members of a single
corporate family.244
Given the widening global reach of Chinese SOEs, it appears inevitable that
someday Chinese SOEs will be accused of conspiracy in violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act, and the SOE defendants may raise the single-entity
defense. The difficult question then will be the extent to which Chinese SOEs
should be considered units of a single economic entity and therefore immune
from section 1 liability. Our analysis suggests that the answer should not turn on
ownership alone. Factual inquiries into the actual control of the SOEs—the kind
of inquiries the ACCC and the European Commission suggested but did not
undertake in the merger context—will be necessary.245
An even more perplexing question in horizontal agreement analysis posed by
Chinese state capitalism is whether privately owned Chinese firms could ever
resort to the single-entity defense. Courts have treated ownership as the primary
indicia of corporate control, but U.S. case law has little to say about how
ownership and control are related.246 Indeed, courts have extended single-entity
immunity to governance structures not characterized by ownership, including
the agency relationship,247 the franchisor–franchisee relationship,248 and the
relationship between a trade association and its members,249 among others. In
2010, the U.S. Supreme Court put a halt to this trend in American Needle, Inc. v.
National Football League, holding that the single-entity defense is not available
to the thirty-two member teams of the National Football League when they
jointly license their intellectual property rights to apparel manufacturers.250 But
the American Needle case did not provide an analytical framework for courts to
apply when differentiating between concerted and independent action.251 So it
remains possible, at least in theory, for private Chinese firms not connected by
243. Id. at 771–72 (internal quotation marks omitted).
244. See, e.g., Eichorn v. AT & T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 139 (3d Cir. 2001) (extending single-entity
immunity to a parent accused of conspiring with a subsidiary it was readying for sale); Davidson &
Schaaff, Inc. v. Liberty Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 1995) (extending single-entity
immunity to sibling corporations); Leaco Enters., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 737 F. Supp. 605, 608–09 (D.
Or. 1990) (extending single-entity immunity to corporate families with more than ninety percent
ownership).
245. Such factual inquiries should focus on whether the government exercises influence over the
strategic or operational decisions of the SOEs, irrespective of the state’s equity ownership.
246. See Dean V. Williamson, Organization, Control, and the Single Entity Defense in Antitrust, 5
J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 723, 726 (2009).
247. See Pink Supply Corp. v. Hiebert, Inc., 788 F.2d 1313, 1317 (8th Cir. 1986).
248. See Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 862 F. Supp. 1378, 1386 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Williams v.
Nevada, 794 F. Supp. 1026, 1032 (D. Nev. 1992), aff’d, 999 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
249. See Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric Surgery,
Inc., 185 F.3d 606, 620–21 (6th Cir. 1999).
250. 560 U.S. 183, 201–02 (2010).
251. See Nathaniel Grow, American Needle and the Future of the Single Entity Defense Under
Section One of the Sherman Act, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 449, 455 (2011).

2015]

STATE CAPITALISM AND THE CHINESE FIRM

713

common ownership to assert single-entity status if they demonstrate a unity of
interest and common control by the Chinese state. This argument may be more
plausible in the context of unique Chinese state-capitalism institutions, such as
the quasi-governmental industrial associations discussed in section I.C.
2. Anticorruption
The ownership bias can also be seen in the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA). Enacted in 1977, the FCPA prohibits U.S. companies, certain
foreign issuers of securities, and any persons in U.S. territory from corruptly
making payments to foreign officials for purposes of obtaining or retaining
business.252 The term “foreign official” is defined under the FCPA as
any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any
person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government
or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such
public international organization.253

Both the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission
have interpreted the word “instrumentality” in this definition to include stateowned or state-controlled enterprises, making employees of such enterprises
foreign officials for purposes of the FCPA.254
Our analysis calls into question the appropriateness of this interpretation. As
we have discussed, the boundary between SOEs and POEs in China is often so
blurred that classification on the basis of equity ownership alone is highly
problematic. Even if the ownership type of a Chinese firm can be ascertained
with confidence, it is not clear why assignment of a firm to one box in the
taxonomy or the other should be relevant for purposes of the antibribery laws.
If, as our analysis indicates, SOEs and large POEs in China exhibit substantial
similarities in terms of access to the state and integration into the government’s
policies and priorities, it is conceptually dubious to label all SOEs “instrumentalities” of the state when all large POEs remain outside the scope of the statute.
3. Antisubsidy
Ownership is also a key factor in antisubsidy law. Under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), only a

252. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012).
253. Id. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A).
254. See Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 532 n.225 (2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Note, however, that courts have pushed back against this expansive definition. See,
e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (requiring a five-factor test
for applying the FCPA to SOE employees).
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government or a public body is capable of directly giving subsidies.255 If a
subsidy is given by a private body, it must be demonstrated that the private body
is “entrust[ed] or direct[ed]” by a government or a public body in giving the
subsidy.256 When Chinese SOEs are accused of giving subsidies, a challenging
question arises as to whether they should be considered a public or private body.
Since 2007, the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) has dealt with this
question in a series of cases.257 In Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube
from People’s Republic of China, for example, USDOC investigated whether
certain SOE steel producers provided a subsidy to downstream steel pipe and
tube producers by selling steel inputs for less than adequate remuneration.258
One of the steel input producers was Baosteel, a major SOE. In order to discern
whether Baosteel provided a subsidy, USDOC applied a five-factor test to
determine whether the firm was a public body: (1) government ownership—
because Baosteel was majority-owned by the Chinese government, USDOC
concluded that this factor clearly supported the finding that it was a public
body;259 (2) government presence on the board of directors—USDOC noted
evidence suggesting that some members of Baosteel’s board may have had ties
to the government;260 (3) government control—USDOC determined that the
Chinese government provided no information specific to the activities of
Baosteel;261 (4) pursuit of government interest—USDOC cited statements from
Baosteel’s annual reports referring to the implementation of the government’s
five-year plan and the government’s steel industry policy;262 and (5) creation by
statute—USDOC determined that evidence was insufficient to rule out the
possibility that Baosteel was created by statute.263 Ultimately, USDOC concluded that the Chinese government failed to provide sufficient information

255. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 1.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 14 (“[A] subsidy shall be deemed to exist if . . . there is a financial contribution by a
government or any public body within the territory of a Member . . . .”).
256. Id. art. 1.1(a)(1)(iv).
257. See, e.g., Certain New Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires from the People’s Republic of China:
Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Negative Determination of Critical
Circumstances, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,480 (July 15, 2008); Laminated Woven Sacks from the People’s
Republic of China: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Affirmative Determination, in Part, of Critical Circumstances, 73 Fed. Reg. 35,639 (June 24, 2008); Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Investigation
Determination, 73 Fed. Reg. 35,642 (June 24, 2008); Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from
the People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final
Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances, 73 Fed. Reg. 31,966 (June 5, 2008).
258. See Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., to David M.
Spooner, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Import Admin., on the Final Determination in the Countervailing
Duty Investigation of Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from the People’s Republic of China
8–9 (June 13, 2008), available at http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/prc/E8-14250-1.pdf.
259. See id. at 29.
260. See id.
261. See id. at 30.
262. See id.
263. See id.
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necessary to conduct the five-factor test other than the levels of government
ownership of Baosteel.264 Consequently, the U.S. agency adopted a rule of
majority ownership under which Baosteel was determined to be a public body
because it was majority owned by the government.265
This majority-ownership rule won support at a WTO Dispute Settlement
Panel in DS379 that was established to hear China’s challenges against the rule,
among other issues.266 Based largely on textual analysis, the WTO Panel
interpreted the term “public body” in article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement to
mean “any entity controlled by a government.”267 The Panel considered government ownership to be “highly relevant” and “potentially dispositive” evidence
of government control,268 and on that basis, upheld USDOC’s public-body
determinations as to the SOE input suppliers.269
On appeal, the WTO Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s decision.270 The
Appellate Body held that “evidence of government ownership, in itself, is not
evidence of meaningful control of an entity by government and cannot, without
more, serve as a basis for establishing that the entity is vested with authority to
perform a governmental function.”271 Because USDOC only focused on government ownership and did not comply with its obligation to seek information on
the other factors in conducting its five-factor test, the Appellate Body reversed
the Panel’s finding that China did not establish that USDOC acted inconsistently with the obligations of the United States under article 1.1(1)(a) of the
SCM Agreement.272
The Appellate Body in DS379 deserves credit for avoiding the common
mistake of conflating government ownership with government control. In a
subsequent WTO dispute settlement proceeding, DS437, a WTO Dispute Settlement Panel further clarified that the Appellate Body in DS379 intended to move
away from a control-based definition of public body.273 According to the Panel
in DS437, the Appellate Body in DS379 equated a public body not with

264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See Report of the Panel, United States—Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on
Certain Products from China, ¶ 8.136, WT/DS379/R (Oct. 22, 2010) (“We find no legal error, in
analyzing whether an entity is a public body, in giving primacy to evidence of majority governmentownership.”).
267. Id. ¶ 8.94.
268. Id. ¶ 8.134.
269. See id. ¶ 8.142.
270. See Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing
Duties on Certain Products from China, ¶ 347, WT/DS379/AB/R (Mar. 11, 2011).
271. Id. ¶ 346.
272. See id. ¶ 340.
273. See Report of the Panel, United States—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products
from China, ¶ 7.72, WT/DS437/R (July 14, 2014) (“Therefore, as noted by the Appellate Body, simple
ownership or control by a government of an entity is not sufficient to establish that it is a public
body.”).
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governmental control but with governmental functions.274 In light of our analysis, this move by the WTO is in the right direction because, as applied to
Chinese firms operating under the institutions of Chinese state capitalism, a
control-based definition of “public body” would require not only SOEs but also
POEs to be subject to the “public body” test. This can be seen by comparing the
outcomes of USDOC’s five-factor test, which is based on government control,
for a Chinese SOE and for a large Chinese POE: (1) the government is likely to
have a presence on the board of the POE, in the form of politically connected
entrepreneurs, that differs little from the political connections of high-level SOE
managers; (2) the government does not exercise day-to-day control over either
the POE or the SOE (indeed, as we suggested, the government may not even
control the SOE as to some policy matters); (3) the POE is as likely as the SOE
to embrace government interest; and (4) few, if any, Chinese firms are created
by special statute. A control-based definition of “public body” in the Chinese
context would therefore require a substantial broadening of the WTO subsidy
rules to cover firms of all ownership types. This raises challenges both to the
WTO’s institutional capacity and to the faithful interpretation of the original
meaning of the treaty text. The alternative definition of “public body” based on
whether an entity exercises governmental functions would avoid these thorny
issues.
CONCLUSION
This Article has offered a new perspective on Chinese firms. Shifting the
focus of analysis from corporate ownership to the state-centered institutional
ecology in which firms operate exposes similarities between state-owned enterprises and privately owned enterprises in China. Our perspective suggests less
state control over SOEs and greater state control over POEs than is commonly
assumed. Because the Chinese economy under the institutions of state capitalism is highly susceptible to capture (understood broadly to mean both corrupt
access to government and a deep convergence of interests between managerial
elites in the party-state and business), successful Chinese firms of all ownership
types share important traits that distinctions based on corporate ownership alone
simply do not pick up. Yet prevailing theories, policies, and regulatory regimes
take equity ownership as their focal point, dividing the world into a simple
taxonomy of SOEs and POEs. Understanding the blurriness of this dividing line
in the Chinese institutional context and recognizing that many large, successful
Chinese firms exhibit substantial similarities in terms of market dominance,
receipt of state subsidies, proximity to state power, and execution of the state’s
developmental policy objectives, is the starting point for rethinking the ap-

274. See id. ¶ 7.73 (“In none of these investigations did the USDOC rely on evidence of the kind
that led the Appellate Body to conclude in US–Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) that
the USDOC had before it evidence indicating that state-owned commercial banks exercised ‘governmental functions.’”).
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proach to a wide range of issues. This insight, for example, bears strongly on
the necessary scope of China’s economic reforms. And it has thorny implications for many U.S. and multilateral economic regulatory regimes, which pivot
on “state” versus “private” ownership of enterprise.
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APPENDIX I275
Politically Connected Entrepreneurs at China’s 100 Largest Private Firms
(by Revenue)276

Firm
Rank

Firm

Founder or
De Facto
Controller

Party-State Affiliations277

1

Suning Appliance Co., Ltd.

ZHANG Jindong

2

Legend Holdings Co., Ltd.

LIU Chuanzhi

CPPCC
CPC National Delegate; NPC; ACFIC (Vice President)

3

Huawei Investment Holdings Co., Ltd.

REN Zhengfei

None278

4

Jiangsu Sha Steel Group Co., Ltd.

SHEN Wenrong

NPC; CPC National Delegate

5

Shandong Weiqiao Group Co., Ltd.

ZHANG Shiping

NPC; Shandong Prov. PC

6

Zhejiang Geeli Holdings Group Co., Ltd. LI Shufu

CPPCC; Taizhou City PC

7

Dalian Wanda Group Co., Ltd.

WANG Jianlin

CPC National Delegate; CPPCC (Standing Comm.);
ACFIC (Vice President)

8

Yurun Holdings Group Co., Ltd.

ZHU Yicai

NPC; ACFIC (Standing Comm.)

9

Wanke Enterprises Co. Ltd.

WANG Shi

China Real Estate Association; Shenzhen Chamber of
Commerce

10 Meidi Group Co., Ltd.

HE Xiangjian

Shunde District PC; Foshan City PPCC

11 Hengli Group Co., Ltd.

CHEN Jianhua

Jiangsu Prov. PPCC; Jiangsu Prov. FIC (Vice
President)

12 Xinjiang Guanghui Industry Investment SUN Guangxin
(Group) Co., Ltd.

Xinjiang PPCC (Standing Comm.); ACFIC (Standing
Comm.)

13 Sani Heavy Industry Co., Ltd.

LIANG Wengen

NPC; CPC National Delegate; ACFIC (Executive
Comm.)

14 New Hope Group Co., Ltd.

LIU Yonghao

CPPCC (Standing Comm.); China Feedstock Industrial
Association (Vice President)

15 Hailiang Group Co., Ltd.

FENG Yali

Zhejiang Prov. CPC Delegate; Zhuji City PC

275. The party-state affiliations of the entrepreneurs listed in Appendices I and II are gathered
primarily from the official websites of the companies in question. When official company information
is not available, we used information collected from news items in the Chinese media. Affiliations
include both present and past ones. The names of the companies listed in this table were translated by
the authors and may not conform to the companies’ official English names.
276. The ranking was conducted by All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce in 2013. See
2013 Zhôngguó Mı́nqı̌ 500 Qiáng Jicxiǎo Sûnı́ng Liánxiǎng Huáwèi Jû Qián Sân [2013 Ranking of
China’s Top 500 Privately Owned Companies Unveiled], XINLÀNG CÁIJING [SINA FIN. & ECON.] (Aug.
29, 2013, 10:18), http://finance.sina.com.cn/leadership/mroll/20130829/101816602059.shtml.
277. The abbreviations used in this column and the same column in Appendix II below are: CPPCC
(China People’s Political Consultative Conference); CPC (Chinese Communist Party); ACFIC (All-China
Federation of Industry and Commerce); FIC (Federation of Industry and Commerce); NPC (National People’s
Congress); PPCC (People’s Political Consultative Conference); and PC (People’s Congress).
278. The fact that Mr. Ren Zhengfei of Huawei does not have any formal government affiliations is
very likely due to his and the Chinese government’s desires to minimize such affiliations, given that Mr.
Ren’s past affiliation with the Chinese military has already subjected Huawei to close scrutiny in the
United States. See ROGERS & RUPPERSBERGER, supra note 36, at 13–14.
279. It is unclear why Rizhao Steel appears on this list, given that sixty-seven percent of its shares
are now owned by the state-owned Shandong Steel Group. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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Party-State Affiliations277

16 Zhejiang Hengyi Group Co., Ltd.

QIU Jianlin

China Chemical Fiber Industrial Association (Vice
President)

17 Zhongtian Steel Group Co., Ltd.

DONG Caiping

NPC; Jiangsu Prov. CPC Delegate; Jiangsu Prov. PC;
Changzhou City PC

18 Beijing Jianlong Heavy Industry Group ZHANG Zhixiang
Co., Ltd.

China Metallurgic Industrial Association (Vice
President); China Steel Industrial Association (Vice
President)

19 Hangzhou Wahaha Group Co., Ltd.

ZONG Qinghou

NPC; Zhejiang Prov. PC; Hangzhou City PC

20 Xinhua United Metallurgic Holdings
Group Co., Ltd.

SUN Jimu

NPC

21 Pang Da Automobile Trade Group Co., PANG Qinghua
Ltd.

China Automobile Supply Chain Industrial Association
(Vice President)

22 Shandong New Hope Liuhe Group Co., TAO Xi
Ltd.

China Meat Products Industrial Association (Executive
Comm.)

23 Jiangsu San Fang Xiang Group Co.,
Ltd.

Jiangsu Prov. PC; Jiangyin City PC (Standing Comm.);
Wuxi City CPC Delegate

BU Xingcai

24 San Bao Group Co., Ltd.

YUAN Yafei

CPPCC; ACFIC (Standing Comm.)

25 Suning Global Group Co., Ltd.

ZHANG Guiping

Jiangsu Prov. PPCC (Standing Comm.); ACFIC;
Jiangsu Prov. FIC (Vice President)

26 Shanghai Fuxing Hi-Tech (Group) Co., GUO Guangchang
Ltd.

NPC; ACFIC (Standing Comm.)

27 Hebei Jinxi Steel Group Co., Ltd.

HAN Jingyuan

Hebei Prov. PC; China Steel Industrial Association
(Vice President)

28 Shandong Chenxi Group Co. Ltd.

SHAO Zhongyi

NPC; Shandong Prov. FIC (Vice President); Rizhao
City PC; Rizhao City PPCC

29 Shaanxi Dongling Industry Trade
Group Co. Ltd.

LI Heiji

NPC; Dongling Village, Baoji City CPC Secretary

30 Jiangsu Xicheng Sanlian Holdings
Group Co., Ltd.

YUN Xiangcai

Jiangyin City Charitable Association (Executive
Comm.)

31 Jiulong Paper (Holdings) Co., Ltd.

ZHANG Qian

CPPCC; ACFIC

32 BYD Co., Ltd.

WANG Chuanfu

Shenzhen City PC (Standing Comm.)

33 Zhejiang Rongsheng Holdings Group
Co., Ltd.

LI Shuirong

China Chemical Fiber Industrial Association (Vice
President); Hangzhou Chamber of Commerce (Vice
President); Xiaoshan District, Hangzhou City PC
(Standing Comm.)

34 Tianjin Rongcheng United Steel Group ZHANG Xiangqing
Co., Ltd.

Tangshan City PC

35 Inner Mongolia Yitai Group Co., Ltd.

ZHANG Shuangwang Erduosi Credit Promotion Association (Honorary
President)

36 Rizhao Steel Holdings Group Co.,
Ltd.279

DU Shuanghua

Hengshui City PC, Hebei Prov. PC

37 Youngor Group Co., Ltd.

LI Rucheng

NPC

38 Jiangsu New Long River Industry
Group Co., Ltd.

LI Liangbao

Long River Village, Jiangyin City CPC Secretary

39 Qingshan Holdings Group Co., Ltd.

ZHANG Jimin

Wenzhou City PC; China Metal Industrial Association
Stainless Steel Sub-Association (Vice President)

40 Country Garden Holdings Co., Ltd.

YANG Guoqiang

Guangdong Prov. PPCC (Standing Comm.)

41 Wumei Holdings Group Co., Ltd.

WU Jianzhong

Beijing City PC, China Supply Chain and Procurement
Industrial Association (Vice President)

42 Tongwei Group Co., Ltd.

LIU Hanyuan

CPPCC (Standing Comm.); ACFIC, China Feedstock
Industrial Association (Vice President)

720

Firm
Rank

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

Firm

Founder or
De Facto
Controller

[Vol. 103:665

Party-State Affiliations277

43 Zhongtian Development Holdings
Group Co., Ltd.

LOU Yongliang

Zhejiang Prov. PC; Zhejiang Prov. FIC (Vice
President)

44 Aux Group Co., Ltd.

ZHENG Jianjiang

NPC; Zhejiang Prov. PPCC; Zhejiang Chamber of
Commerce (Vice President)

45 Hongdou Group Co., Ltd.

ZHOU Yaoting

NPC

46 ENN Group Co., Ltd.

WANG Yusuo

CPPCC (Standing Comm.); Hebei Prov. PPCC
(Standing Comm.); Hebei Prov. FIC (Vice
President)

47 Dunan Holdings Group Co., Ltd.

YAO Xinyi

Zhejiang Prov. PC

48 Linyi Xincheng Jinluo Meat Products
Group Co., Ltd.

ZHOU Liankui

Shandong Prov. PC

49 New China United Group Co., Ltd.

FU Jun

CPPCC; ACFIC (Vice President); Hainan Prov. FIC
(Vice President)

50 Jiangsu Nantong Sanjian Group Co.,
Ltd.

XU Zhulin

Haimen City PPCC (Standing Comm.); China
Construction Industrial Association (Executive
Comm.)

51 Jiangsu Yonggang Group Co., Ltd.

WU Dongcai

Yonglian Village, Zhangjiagang City CPC Secretary

52 Jiangyin Chengxing Industrial Group
Co., Ltd.

LI Xing

China Petrochemical Industrial Association (Vice
President)

53 Tianneng Group

ZHANG Tianren

NPC; Zhejiang Prov. CPC Delegate; Zhejiang Prov.
PC

54 Sichuan Chuanwei Group Co., Ltd.

WANG Jin

NPC; Chengdu City FIC

55 Jiangxi Ping Steel Industrial Co., Ltd.

TU Jianmin

CPC National Delegate

56 Sichuan Hongda (Group) Co., Ltd.

LIU Canglong

NPC; ACFIC (Vice President); Sichuan Prov. FIC
(Vice President)

57 Shenghong Holdings Group Co., Ltd.

MU Hangen

Suzhou City PPCC

58 Yuanda Wuchan Group Co., Ltd.

JIN Bo

Ningbo City Foreign Trade Industrial Association
(Vice President)

59 Jiangsu Shente Steel Co., Ltd.

YANG Jianzhong

Liyang City PPCC (Vice President)

60 Zhongnan Holdings Group Co., Ltd.

CHEN Jinshi

Guangdong Real Estate Chamber of Commerce
(President)

61 Kechuang Holdings Group Co., Ltd.

HE Junming

NPC; ACFIC (Vice President); Sichuan Prov. PPCC
(Standing Comm.); Sichuan Prov. FIC (Vice
President)

62 Chaowei Group

ZHOU Mingming

Huzhou City PC; Changxing County PC

63 Oriental Hope Group Co., Ltd.

LIU Yongxing

Shanghai City FIC

64 Huasheng Jiangquan Group Co., Ltd.

WANG Yanjiang

Shenquan Village, Linyi City CPC Secretary

65 Shandong Taishan Steel Group Co.,
Ltd.

WANG Shoudong

NPC

66 Jiangsu Nantong Erjian Group Co.,
Ltd.

CHEN Jiannian

None

67 Yinyi Group Co., Ltd.

XIONG Xuqiang

Ningbo City Chamber of Commerce (Vice President)

68 Huaqin Rubber Industry Group Co.,
Ltd.

NIU Yishun

Shandong Prov. PC

69 Golden Dragon Precision Copper Pipes LI Changjie
Group Co., Ltd.

NPC; Henan Prov. CPC Delegate

70 Xiuzheng Pharmaceutical Group Co.,
Ltd.

XIU Laigui

Jilin Prov. PC; ACFIC (Executive Comm.); Jilin Prov.
FIC (Vice President)

71 Zhengtai Group Co., Ltd.

NAN Cunhui

Taizhou City PC; Wenling City PC
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72

Ningbo Jintian Investment Holdings
Co., Ltd.

LOU Guoqiang

ACFIC; Jingbo City PC; China Non-Ferrous Metal
Processing Industrial Association (Vice President)

73

Jiangsu Gaoli Group Co., Ltd.

GAO Shijun

Nanjing City PPCC; Jiangsu Prov. FIC (Standing
Comm.); Nanjing City FIC (Vice President)

74

Twins (Group) Co., Ltd.

BAO Hongxing

None

75

Yunnan Zhonghao Zhiye Co., Ltd.

LIU Weigao

NPC; Kunming City FIC (Vice President)

76

Huatai Group Co., Ltd.

CHEN Xianbao

Anhui Prov. PPCC; Hefei City PPCC (Vice President);
Anhui Prov. FIC (Vice President)

77

Sichuan Desheng Group Steel Co., Ltd. SONG De-An

Sichuan Prov. PPCC

78

Jiangsu Yangzijiang Ship Group Co.,

REN Yuanlin

Jiangyin City PPCC

79

Jiuzhoutong Pharmaceutical Group
Co., Ltd.

LIU Baolin

Hubei Prov. PC

80

Chongqing Longhu Enterprise
Development Co., Ltd.

WU Yajun

NPC; Chongqing City FIC (Vice President)

81

Shandong Jincheng Petro-Chemical
Group Co., Ltd.

ZHOU Jingcai

Shandong Prov. PC

82

Sichuan Kelun Industry Group Co.,
Ltd.

LIU Gexin

CPPCC; Sichuan Prov. PC; Sichuan Prov. CPC
Delegate; Sichuan Prov. FIC (Vice President)

83

Zhejiang Zhongcheng Holdings Group WANG Yongquan
Co., Ltd.

Shaoxing City PC (Standing Comm.)

84

Guangsha Holdings Group Co., Ltd.

LOU Zhongfu

NPC; ACFIC (Executive Committee)

85

Shanghai People Enterprise (Group)
Co., Ltd.

JIN Fuyin

Shanghai City PC; Shanghai City PPCC; Shanghai
City FIC (Standing Comm.)

86

Shandong Jingbo Holdings Co., Ltd.

MA Yunsheng

Shandong Prov. PC; Binzhou City PC (Standing
Comm.); ACFIC

87

Yabang Investment Holdings Group
Co., Ltd.

XU Xiaochu

Wujin District Chamber of Commerce (Vice President)

88

People Electronics Group Co., Ltd.

ZHENG Yuanbao

Jiangxi Prov. PPCC; Shanghai City PPCC; Wenzhou
City PC; Nanchang City PC

89

Delixi Group Co., Ltd.

HU Chengzhong

Zhejiang Prov. PC; ACFIC (Executive Comm.);
Zhejiang Prov. FIC (Vice President)

90

Zhejiang Qiancheng Investment Co.,
Ltd.

SHEN Zhihong

Ningbo City PPCC (Standing Comm.)

91

Huafang Group Co., Ltd.

QIN Daqian

None

92

Qingjian Group Co., Ltd.

DU Bo

NPC; Qingdao City PC

93

Lihuayi Group Co., Ltd.

XU Yunting

Shandong Prov. CPC Delegate; Dongying City PC

94

Baixing Group Co., Ltd.

RU Boxing

Changzhou City PC; Changzhou City CPC Delegate;
China Plastics Industrial Association (Vice
President)

95

Tianzheng Group Co., Ltd.

GAO Tianle

CPPCC

96

Hengtong Group Co., Ltd.

CUI Genliang

NPC; Jiangsu Prov. PPCC; Suzhou City PC

97

Tangshan Guofeng Steel Co., Ltd.

ZHANG Zhen

Hebei Prov. Enterprise Association (Vice President)

98

Tianjin Baodi Agriculture &
Technology Co., Ltd.

BI Guoxiang

Jianye District (Nanjing) PC; Jianye District FIC (Vice
President); China Foodstuff Industrial Association
(Executive Comm.)

99

Shengtong Technology Group Co., Ltd. LI Ruishi

100 Shandong Dahai Group Co., Ltd.

LIU Fuhai

NPC
None
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1

Tencent

Pony Ma

NPC, Shenzhen City PC

2

Alibaba Group

Jack Ma

Zhejiang Prov. PPCC

3

Baidu

Robin Li

CPPCC, CNAIC (Vice President)

4

JD.com

Liu Qiangdong

Shanghai City PPCC

5

Sohu

Zhang Chaoyang

CNAIC (Executive Comm.)

6

Qihu 360

Zhou Hongwei

None

7

Xiaomi Technology

Lei Jun

NPC

8

NetEase

Ding Lei

Guangdong Prov. PC

9

Suning Appliance

Zhang Jindong

CPPCC

10

Sina

Wang Zhidong

None

280. The ranking was conducted by China Internet Association in 2014. See 2014 Nián Zhôngguó
Hùliánwǎng Bǎiqiáng Qǎyè Bǎngdân Jicxiǎo [2014 Ranking of China’s Top 100 Internet Companies
Unveiled], SOHU IT (Aug. 28, 2014, 18:09:20), http://it.sohu.com/20140828/n403865758.shtml.

